CEO职务角色探析

本文综述了CEO职务角色的形成与职责，并以美国部分杰出CEO为样本，分析了CEO的生存环境特征、类型与作用、变更与退休等问题。     

The Role of Lending Banks in Forced CEO Turnovers

This article investigates the governance role of banks exercised through the replacement of underperforming CEOs in borrowing firms. An average level of bank loans outstanding implies a 22% to 47% increase in the forced turnover probability of a borrowing firm’s CEO if a firm’s industry adjusted performance is one standard deviation below average. This increase is much larger, 68% to 92%, when an underperforming firm violates its loan covenants. Overall, the paper’s findings suggest that banks play a key role in the governance of underperforming firms, especially when covenants are violated.     

CEO's empathy and salience of socioemotional wealth in family SMEs – The moderating role of external directors

A focus on preserving socioemotional wealth may influence entrepreneurial activities in family firms. In this paper, we identify the emotion of empathy in the family CEO as an antecedent of socioemotional wealth creation. We argue that the presence of one or more external directors can have a direct as well as moderating influence on the relationship between CEO's empathy and the salience of socioemotional wealth to the family CEO. Our empirical tests confirm these hypotheses. Several areas of future research are suggested to incorporate empathy and other emotions in family business studies.     

Does Overconfidence Affect Corporate Investment? CEO Overconfidence Measures Revisited

This article presents the growing research area of Behavioural Corporate Finance in the context of one specific example: distortions in corporate investment due to CEO overconfidence. We first review the relevant psychology and experimental evidence on overconfidence. We then summarise the results of Malmendier and Tate (2005a) on the impact of overconfidence on corporate investment. We present supplementary evidence on the relationship between CEOs’ press portrayals and overconfident investment decisions. This alternative approach to measuring overconfidence, developed in Malmendier and Tate (2005b), relies on the perception of outsiders rather than the CEO's own actions. The robustness of the results across such diverse proxies jointly corroborates previous findings and suggests new avenues to measuring executive overconfidence.     

Reining in auditors: On the dynamics of power surrounding an “innovation” in the regulatory space

In the aftermath of Enron and the collapse of Arthur Andersen, new “independent” institutions were created to oversee financial auditing. Based on a modified version of Lukes’ multidimensional model of power, we first investigate how the creation of the Canadian Public Accountability Board (CPAB) has affected the dynamics of power among the main players enlisted in Canada’s regulation of public accounting. Our findings strengthen the view that a “form of allegiance” was, at the time of data collection, developing between CPAB and the largest Canadian accounting firms. Through a second analytical movement, we extend the boundaries of our argument, showing that patterns of resistance against the logic of arm’s length regulation operate in a variety of audit regulatory sites. Our conclusion points, in particular, to the spatial gap - and incidentally the limitations - of any attempt to control and supervise a globalized industry from a national or regional perspective.     

The impacts of SOX and SEC investigation on the corporate governance of option backdating firms

This study investigates the combined impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) and the subsequent related Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) initiatives on the corporate governance characteristics of firms that had historically backdated stock options. Our results show that backdating firms had both weaker board-level and committee-level corporate governance characteristics than control firms in the pre-SOX period. In contrast, backdating firms dress up their board-level governance to meet regulatory requirements but still feature weaker committee-level corporate governance in the post-SOX era.     

Value or Glamour? An empirical investigation of the effect of celebrity CEOs on financial reporting practices and firm performance

In this study, I investigate the impact of managerial reputation, as proxied by high‐profile awards to CEOs, on financial reporting practices and firm performance. Using a sample of 269 awards given to 189 celebrity CEOs (CEOs who win awards) from 1987 to 2003, I compare within‐firm changes in financial reporting practices and firm performance before and after each CEO wins their first award. I find that celebrity CEOs engage in more conservative accounting practices and are less likely to engage in opportunistic earnings management to meet short‐term earnings benchmarks. In addition, firm performance improves after celebrity CEOs win awards.     

家族管理与CEO支配力对企业价值之影响

本文以台湾上市公司为研究对象,实证探讨家族管理与CEO支配力对企业价值之影响,研究结果发现:控制股东之家族成员参与高阶管理团队时,若增强CEO结构支配力,减弱CEO股权支配力,对企业价值具有正面影响.因此,从本研究可获得启示,若控制股东家族希望能够借由参与高阶管理团队以提升企业价值,应同时考虑CEO支配力之影响.     

CEO organizational identification and firm cash holdings

As the decision-makers and implementers of a firm’s financial strategy, executives play a critical role in cash holding activities, and their psychological characteristics have a major impact on cash holdings. This paper investigates the association between CEO organizational identification and firm cash holdings. The empirical results show that CEO organizational identification is negatively associated with firm cash holdings, and the negative association is more pronounced when the level of financial development is higher and economic uncertainty is lower. Further analysis reveals that the higher a CEO’s organizational identification, the higher the firm’s R&D investment and capital expenditure, and high CEO organizational identification can increase the value of firm cash holdings. Overall, our findings supplement the literature on organizational identification and cash holdings, and on the effect of executives’ psychological characteristics on corporate financial decision-making.     

Government Controlling and Firm Performance： An Empirical Study on China＇s Listed Companies

The current study compares the firm performance in China＇s listed companies by distinguishing the governance controlling of three types of state-shareholder. The results indicate that the performances in firms with direct government controlling are significantly weaker than other firms. In contrast, the performances in firms without direct government controlling are not significantly different. The results suggest that the introduction of market-oriented state-share holders is a desirable process during the transition economy in China.