氟硅酸泵的国产化实践

硅氟酸极具腐蚀性 ,考虑到经济性 ,2 0 #合金、哈氏合金、蒙乃尔等贵金属很少被选为泵材。由于橡胶、塑料等高分子材料具有很好的抗蚀性和一定的机械性能 ,且价格便宜 ,因此一般选用其作为泵体材料。我们通过分析、比较 ,成功选择国产氟硅酸泵替代国外进口泵 ,实现国产化。     

预防液化石油气储罐应力腐蚀的初探

液化石油气储罐在工业和人民生活中有着广泛的应用,探讨液化石油气中所含H2S腐蚀介质对储罐的应力腐蚀及预防措施显得非常重要。     

浅议会计委派制

分析了“会计委派制”产生的背景和目前存在的问题．提出了会计体制改革的方向应该是：继续国有企业的体制改革，特别是股份制改革；建立司法监督、行政监督、社会监督和企业内部会计监督相结合的的监督管理体系；建立一种“立法型”的会计监督模式。     

工作本位学习理论的系统分析

工作本位学习是基于从学校到工作岗位(school-to-work)的理念下提出来的,试图整合学习策略和工作实践,促进学习者的学习,以更好适应工作的需要。工作本位课程理论是在上述理念基础上开发出来的,对我国高职教育提供有益的启示。     

绩效与不足:建国初期农村信用合作社的借贷活动的历史考察——以鄂湘赣三省为中心

农村信用合作社是建国初期农村金融体系的重要组成部分，它的产生是新中国乡村借贷关系转型和现代化的标志之一。信用社借贷有利于农户的生产生活经营，推动了农村经济的恢复与发展，但其也存在一定的缺陷。     

How to get firms to invest: A simple solution to the hold-up problem in regulation

Abstract. Many governmental programs are effective only if firms make costly investments. The inability of authorities to precommit to a regulatory scheme creates incentives for firms not to invest and to hold-up the regulator. This paper describes a simple subsidy/tax scheme embedded in a four-stage mechanism that solves the hold-up problem. We design a self-financing subsidy/tax scheme which benefits a complying firm at the expense of a non-complying firm. In order to be credible, the subsidy and tax rates must maximize social welfare for any combination of investment decisions. We show that there exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in which all firms invest and no actual implementation with subsidies and taxes is required. We discuss in which cases the mechanism can work under incomplete information. Received: 30 December 1998 / Accepted: 12 October 2001     

关于企业生命力评估的指标体系设计

阐述了评估企业生命力的意义，提出了评估企业生命力的原则，并设计了企业生命力评估的指标体系。     

Central governance or subsidiarity: A property-rights approach to federalism

We consider a model where one region in a federation can realize a public project after undertaking value-increasing investments. While negotiations on the federal level ensure that an efficient project size is implemented in equilibrium, non-contractibility of investments causes the overall outcome to differ across regimes. If the region bears the entire implementation costs of its policies, underinvestment prevails and subsidiarity (centralized governance) is superior when spillovers are weak (strong). Conversely, if linear cost sharing arrangements are feasible, decentralized authority often admits a socially optimal outcome while centralized authority (with majority or unanimity rule) does not.     

Symmetry and order in the portfolio allocation problem

Summary. This research studies the role of multivariate distribution structures on random asset returns in determining the optimal allocation vector for an expected utility maximizer. All our conclusions pertain for the set of risk averters. By carefully disturbing symmetry in the distribution of the, possibly covarying, returns, we ascertain the ordinal structure of the optimized allocation vector. Rank order of allocations is also established when a permutation symmetric random vector is mapped into the returns vector through location and scale shifts. It is shown that increased dispersion in the vectors of location and scale parameters benefit, ex-ante, investors as does a decrease in the rank correlation coefficient between the location and scale parameter vectors. Revealed preference comparative static results are identified for the location and scale vectors of asset returns. For most issues addressed, we arrive at much stronger inferences when a safe asset is available. Received: August 8, 2000; revised version: January 8, 2001     

Economics and underdetermination: a case study of urban land and housing economics

Underdetermination, associated with the Duhem–Quine thesis,is a familiar if under-researched theme in economics. In thelight of this, we examine the development of urban land andhousing economics. Through its Cartesian dualistic delineationof theory and data, the contemporary mainstream approach appearsunable to circumvent the problem of underdetermination. In effect,it employs the strong version of Duhem–Quine in its retentionof the assumption of a single, unitary competitive market (andassociated access–space trade-off). Conversely, we highlightthe affinity of Ely's (and the later Columbia School's) approachto pragmatists Dewey and Peirce, which provides a more fruitfulbasis for explanation.