Disclosing a Random Walk

We examine a dynamic disclosure model in which the value of a firm follows a random walk. Every period, with some probability, the manager learns the firm's value and decides whether to disclose it. The manager maximizes the market perception of the firm's value, which is based on disclosed information. In equilibrium, the manager follows a threshold strategy with thresholds below current prices. He sometimes reveals pessimistic information that reduces the market perception of the firm's value. He does so to reduce future market uncertainty, which is valuable even under risk-neutrality.     

ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH AND CHOICE OF RESIDENCE

This paper analyses the relationships between the values and dispersion of residential properties and the environmental-health quality of their locations. It constructs residents' health-adjusted lifetime-utility function by combining satisfaction from consumption over the lifespan with risk to life from living in an environmentally unhealthy location. It employs this utility function to analyse willingness to pay for environmental-health quality, choice of location and residential dispersion and its relationship with income distribution.