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Are Overconfident CEOs Better Innovators? 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Previous empirical work on adverse consequences of CEO overconfidence raises the question of why firms hire overconfident managers. Theoretical research suggests a reason: overconfidence can benefit shareholders by increasing investment in risky projects. Using options‐ and press‐based proxies for CEO overconfidence, we find that over the 1993–2003 period, firms with overconfident CEOs have greater return volatility, invest more in innovation, obtain more patents and patent citations, and achieve greater innovative success for given research and development expenditures. However, overconfident managers achieve greater innovation only in innovative industries. Our findings suggest that overconfidence helps CEOs exploit innovative growth opportunities. 相似文献
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Barras, Scaillet, and Wermers propose the false discovery rate (FDR) to separate skill (alpha) from luck in fund performance. Using simulations with parameters informed by the data, we find that this methodology is conservative and underestimates the proportion of nonzero‐alpha funds. For example, 65% of funds with economically large alphas of are misclassified as zero alpha. This bias arises from the low signal‐to‐noise ratio in fund returns and the resulting low statistical power. Our results question FDR's applicability in performance evaluation and other domains with low power, and can materially change the conclusion that most funds have zero alpha. 相似文献
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