Climate Change,Heterogeneities, and Stability of International Fiscal Harmonization

This paper analyzes the instability introduced into multilateral agreements by two types of heterogeneity: heterogeneity of countries (size and number of producing members) and heterogeneity of lobbies (asymmetric influence at the national versus the international level). The work extends theoretical prospective analyses on environmental taxation, as illustrated by the harmonization of fuel taxes. We show that the acceptability of the tax set at the multilateral level depends on the type of coalitions that participate in the multilateral negotiation (size and number of producing countries) and the asymmetry in the local (state-level) power of lobbies during negotiations.     

Statistical estimate of the proportional hazard premium of loss

The well known Proportional Hazard Premium Principle, introduced by Wang (1996), depends upon the survival function of the insured risk and a risk aversion index. Using this premium principle, we propose an asymptotically normal semi-parametric estimator for the net-premium of a high-excess loss layer of heavy-tailed claim amounts. An algorithm to compute confidence bounds is given. Moreover, a comparison between this estimator and the non-parametric estimator, proposed by Necir & Boukhetala (2004), is carried out.     

Erratum to: ‘Statistical estimate of the proportional hazard premium of loss’

The asymptotic variance of the risk premium estimator, proposed by Necir et al. (2007), is revised, by using the right asymptotic approximation of the uniform empirical quantile process.     

Agrifood Safety Standards,Market Power,and Consumer Misperceptions

This article analyzes how the public regulation of food safety influences a firm's strategic behaviour in a food chain. In this context, we provide an original theoretical framework to show how, regardless of the level of standard, food safety regulation may have unexpected harmful effects. Namely, the level of compliance costs alone cannot explain the producer exclusion due to a high level of standard. We highlight how upstream producers' involvement in the market also depends on the strategic interest of the downstream firm to remunerate their compliance process. Finally, we show how the actual level of risk does not necessarily decrease when the standard is reinforced.     

Joint Private Safety Standards and Vertical Relationships in Food Retailing

In recent years, it has become common for downstream firms to impose Joint Private Standards (JPSs) on upstream producers. In this paper, we present an original model of a vertical relationship, explaining the incentives for and the effects of such JPSs with an example concerning food safety. The risk of a food crisis is endogenously determined. Using the concept of cartel stability ( d’Aspremont et al., 1983 ), it is shown that liability rules are crucial for JPSs to emerge, that a JPS can become a minimum quality standard, and that a more stringent JPS does not necessarily reduce the market risk.     

Foreign Direct Investment and Training in the Host Country: The Tariff-Jumping Argument Revisited

We analyze the direct investment versus export decision of a multinational firm in competition with a potential entrant in a host country. We consider a workers' skills asymmetry between the host and the multinational home countries. We also give the multinational the possibility to train all (or a part of) the hired workers when investing. We show that an improvement in the workers' skills in the host country does not systematically increase the multinational incentive to invest. We also demonstrate that the tariff-jumping investment can improve the welfare of the host country even if it excludes the local firm from the market.