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Sebouh Aintablian Patricia A. Mcgraw Gordon S. Roberts 《Journal of Business Finance & Accounting》2007,34(1-2):389-401
Abstract: Loan announcement effects for 152 Canadian companies are examined to investigate the efficiency of monitoring by banks facing lender environmental liability. Market reaction to the announcement of bank debt to 'environmental' firms is more positive and significant than for 'non-environmental' firms and, for firms in industries with a higher likelihood of experiencing spill events, is more positive and significant, reinforcing earlier results that establish a relationship between specific loan/borrower characteristics and announcement period excess returns and providing further evidence on the 'uniqueness' of bank loans by demonstrating the superior ability of banks to monitor corporate borrowers exposed to environmental liability. 相似文献
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Gordon S. Roberts Vasumathi Vijayraghavan & Sebouh Aintablian 《European Financial Management》2002,8(3):339-356
French banks and non‐financial companies issue index‐linked debt whose value at maturity is indexed to the CAC 40 or to a basket of European indices. This paper examines stock announcement effects associated with these bonds on three dates: the date the issuer's General Assembly decides future capital needs, the publication in the journal of the COB (the stock market board), and the issue date. We find the issuance of index‐linked debt has significant positive announcement effects on the issue date, which we attribute to its market‐completion property. In order to examine further whether market completion is at play, we decompose the value of the bond at issue into its straight bond and option values. We determine that the bonds are overvalued again supporting market completion. 相似文献
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This paper investigates what induces small firms in an emerging market economy to borrow dollar credit from domestic banks. Our data are from a unique survey of firms in Lebanon. The findings complement studies of large firms with foreign currency loans from foreign lenders. Exporters, naturally hedged against currency risk, are more likely to incur dollar debt. Firms also partly hedge themselves by passing currency risk to customers and suppliers. Less opaque firms with easily verifiable collateral and higher net worth are more likely to access dollar credit. Firms reliant on formal financing (banks and supplier credit) are more likely to contract dollar debt than firms reliant on informal financing (family, friends and moneylenders). Bank relationships, however, do not increase the dollar debt likelihood. And finally, profitable firms are less likely to have dollar debt. Information frictions and limited collateral, therefore, constrain dollar credit even when it is intermediated domestically. 相似文献
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