Investor biases in Japan: Another pathology of Keiretsu

We examine how keiretsu-related institutional investors behave in the Japanese stock market relative to other investor categories for the period from 1985–1998. Based on the agency problem hypothesis for the general bias of institutional investors and the relational distance hypothesis for the unusual bias of keiretsu-affiliated money managers, this paper finds that keiretsu-affiliated money managers over-invest not only in large firms, but also in imprudent firms. The group affiliation of Japanese domestic money managers may drive their portfolio decisions towards financially weak group member firms at the expense of their client investors. Identifying the conditions for this rescue type of investment, we illustrate a rather weak corporate governance foundation of institutional money management in Japan.     

Investor Familiarity and Home Bias: Japanese Evidence

We examine how foreign and domestic portfolio investors, both classified into money managers, invest in Japanese firms over the sample period of 1985–1998. We propose the agency-familiarity hypothesis to explain investment behavior of these institutional investors focusing on the two firm-level variables: market capitalization and export ratios. Both types of institutional investors over-invest in familiar firms measured in firm size while each shows opposite preference patterns with respect to the export ratios. The foreign investors become more export-firm oriented in the second-half sample and the domestic orientation of the domestic institutional investors becomes statistically significant during the same second-half. Because of the location difference of their client investors, the compositions of familiar firms are different between these two types with respect to the firm’s export activities. Home bias at the firm level in terms of the sensitivity to the export ratio is evident for both types of investors, especially, in more recent years, although equity home bias at the country level has been gradually mitigated. Based on these macro- and micro-level results, we conclude that the investment behavior of money managers is more consistent with the agency-familiarity explanation than the information-based explanation regardless of their nationalities.     

Underpricing, Subsequent Equity Offerings, and the Long-Run Performance of Japanese IPOs

Using data on IPOs that are issued in Japan during January 1975–March 1989, we examine the deliberate underpricing and overreaction hypotheses to explain high initial returns at offering dates. Specifically, we analyze the cross-sectional pattern of the short- and long-run performance of IPOs. The obtained results indicate that the deliberate underpricing theories which we examine are unable to explain the high initial returns on the Japanese IPOs. Furthermore, for the average of the IPOs, the empirical results are not consistent with the overreaction hypothesis. However, there is evidence consistent with the hypothesis that for a certain minority group of IPOs, the high initial returns occur due to overreactions by investors. We interpret the overall results as indicating that the high initial returns on the Japanese IPOs can be attributed to a mixture of both underpricing and investor overreaction. We conjecture that the binding regulations in Japan led to underpricing. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.