数据管理:电子商务数据的存储问题

许多情况说明，用于组织中数据存储的消费已经成爆炸状态。产生这种情况的主要因素是电子邮件和电子商务对数据的质量和数量的要求提高了，并且这种数据大部分是分散的、非结构性的，这就增加了对组织中数据管理的要求。本文是在澳大利亚进行的一次调查的基础上做出的，该调查是关于组织中如何处理数据增长和由于数据增长所带来的问题。调查的结果显示人们对该问题表现出高度的关注，同时显示出一种乐观的趋势，即技术将对未来出现的各种各样的问题提供解决方案。     

Understanding the Economic Factors Influencing Farm Policy Preferences

A survey conducted in Mississippi, Texas, Indiana, and Nebraska elicited producers' preferences for various farm policy changes. This permitted examination of the diversity of preferences that single-state studies have not allowed. Five policy choices, including deficiency payments, loan programs, crop insurance, export programs, and disaster payments were examined. Logit model results predicting producer preferences for each of the five dichotomous policy choices are reported. Explanatory variables based on expected utility theory such as risk aversion, price and yield variability, and price–yield correlation are significant in various models.     

Competition and Information Production in Market Maker Models

Abstract:   The microstructure literature models the mechanisms through which fundamental information is incorporated into market prices. This paper extends previous models by endogenising information production and analysing incentives for costly information production. In contrast to the existing literature, increasing the number of informed traders can result in reduced price informativeness. When prices have an allocative role this has welfare consequences: the regulatory implications of a dichotomy between private and public incentives for information gathering are discussed.     

The social construction of genetic abnormality: Ethical implications for managerial decisions in the workplace

This paper examines moral issues concerning a firm's use of genetic information about a prospective employee's predisposition to contract occupational and other illnesses. It critically reviews leading social construction literature on genetic abnormality and genetic screening, and it examines the relevance of arguments from justice and meritocratic principles. It concludes that there is a strong moral presumption against genetic screening in employment.Alan Strudler is Research Scholar at the Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy at the University of Maryland, College Park. He has taught philosophy at Stanford University and California Institute of Technology. His recent writing on professional and corporate responsibility appears inMichigan Law Review andLaw and Philosophy.     

DISCOUNT RATES AND ENERGY EFFICIENCY

Empirical studies provide compelling evidence that economic agents do not adopt the complete range of energy-efficient technologies that are cost-effective under prevailing prices and market conditions. Analysts commonly attribute this anomaly to the use of high discount rates in energy-related decisions-an interpretation that is difficult to reconcile with standard models of rational choice. This paper recasts the controversy from the perspective of economic theory and finds that market failures related to asymmetric information, bounded rationality, and transaction costs are major contributors to the so-called "efficiency gap."     

Exchange Rate Pass‐through: The Role of Regime Changes

We consider the effect on the degree of exchange rate pass‐through of the exchange rate regime in operation. We test the hypothesis that pass‐through will be lower under a float as firms may be reluctant to pass appreciations or depreciations on to their customers when there is a strong chance that they will be subsequently reversed. Taylor’s hypothesis that pass‐through will be lower in a low‐inflation environment is also considered. Both hypotheses are assessed in relation to the price of manufactured imports into New Zealand and we find that, whereas the shift to a float dramatically lowered the degree of pass‐through, the later shift to a low‐inflation regime has no significant additional effect on the pass‐through relationship.     

Multilateral Reforms of Trade and Environmental Policy

The paper analyzes environmental tax policy reform using a competitive model of world trade that includes production‐generated environmental damage (pollution) and trade tariffs. The authors examine the feasibility of Pareto‐improving multilateral reforms of environmental taxes, and show that any environmental tax reform that is mutually welfare‐improving when compensating lump‐sum transfers are assumed is also welfare‐improving when a suitable tariff reform (but no transfers) is combined with the tax changes. Several specific reform proposals are developed. These results expand the feasible set of mutually improving policy proposals for international policy initiatives.     

Monetary union and the Maastricht inflation criterion: The accession countries*

We model an accession country facing a Maastricht‐type inflation criterion that specifies an inflation ceiling. In addition to deciding whether or not to satisfy this criterion, the country must decide how much costly economic reform to undertake. If the country puts enough weight on the future that it can credibly meet the inflation criterion no matter what the ceiling is, then the inflation criterion benefits the country but lowers reform. If the country puts less weight on the future, then a criterion with a properly chosen inflation ceiling can increase reform. We derive the inflation ceilings that maximize the country's welfare and its reform.     

Moral agency as victim of the vulnerability of autonomy

This paper draws upon a research study of accountants and HR specialists. The study eschewed hypothetical scenarios and focused upon those situations and scenarios that the interviewees defined as causing them ethical concerns. There are two distinct but related issues arising from the paper. The first is that the singular categorisations of moral reasoning attributed to individuals when faced with hypothetical scenarios by many who write on the issue of moral reasoning, did not correspond to the fluidity in moral choices faced by the interviewees as they experienced their unfolding moral dilemmas. The second issue relates to the unwillingness of the interviewees to give voice to their concerns, not only externally, but also within their employing organisations. The tensions within the two cases featured were held in check only by the diminution of the autonomy of the two principal actors. As a consequence, the exercise of moral agency was denied.     

Capital structure and the control of managerial incentives

We present a theory of capital structure based on the power of shareholders, bondholders and managers to control the incentive conflicts in large corporations. The manager–owner conflict produces a trade-off between inefficiency in the low state and rents in the high state, and the shareholder–bondholder conflict produces under-investment as in Myers [Journal of Financial Economics 19 (1997) 147]. Since managers and bondholders both prefer more efficient actions in the low state, the two conflicts are interdependent. With risk-less levels of debt, there are no shareholder–bondholder agency costs, but managerial control over the incentive-setting process produces excessive rents. With risky debt, shareholders focus more on returns in the high state so that shareholder–bondholder agency costs increase but managerial rents decrease. Efficient levels of debt holder protection facilitate a reduction in manager–owner agency costs that outweighs shareholder–bondholder agency costs, and are decreasing in firm performance. The results are consistent with the separate empirical results relating control to both compensation and leverage, and suggest how future studies can be integrated.