Estimation of sons' intergenerational earnings mobility in the presence of censoring

Based on intergenerational data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, I provide estimates of income mobility across generations for men. Special attention is paid to issues of censoring caused by a son's unemployment. Employing non‐parametric bounds estimates, I illustrate that previous income mobility estimates rely heavily on (unjustified) assumptions of exogenous selection. Assuming a son's potential income is instead a function of his reason for unemployment and work history, I re‐estimate mobility. Allowing for sampling variability, the range of feasible slopes consistent with these modified bounds restrictions is 0.27 to 0.55. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Social norms,coordination and collaboration in heterogeneous teams

This paper considers the coordinating role of social norms in a heterogeneous team of workers. We define an optimal unit of production as a form of organisation involving several teams and members, with the following properties: (i) a social norm operating to coordinate individual efforts; (ii) a team with heterogeneous skills, enabling generation of synergies. Our model suggests that competences of the best worker are transferred to his or her peers. This collaborative process enhances team efficiency but only if there is an implicit ex ante coordinating device based on social norms that discourage free riding. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Buyer power and supplier incentives

This paper analyzes the origins and welfare consequences of buyer power. We show that if suppliers are capacity constrained or have strictly convex costs, there are two different channels through which large buyers can obtain more favorable terms from their suppliers. In particular, we show how the presence of large buyers can then erode the value of suppliers’ outside option. Somewhat surprisingly, we show how this can induce suppliers to undertake strategies that lead to higher output and potentially higher welfare.     

Competitive search markets for durable goods

Summary. This paper considers a dynamic version of Akerlof's (1970) lemons problem where buyers and sellers must engage in search to find a trading partner. We show that if goods are durable, the market itself may provide a natural sorting mechanism. In equilibrium, high-quality goods sell at a higher price than low-quality goods but also circulate longer. This accords with the common wisdom that sellers who want to sell fast may have to accept a lower price. We then compare the equilibrium outcomes under private information with those under complete information. Surprisingly, we find that for a large range of parameter values the quilibrium outcomes under the two information regimes coincide, despite the fact that circulation time is used to achieve separation. Received: August 24, 2000; revised version: October 24, 2000     

Capacity constrained firms in (labor) markets with adverse selection

Summary. We discuss a competitive (labor) market where firms face capacity constraints and individuals differ according to their productivity. Firms offer two-dimensional contracts like wage and task level. Then workers choose firms and contracts. Workers might be rationed if the number of applicants exceeds the capacity of the firm. We show that under reasonable assumptions on the distribution of capacity an equilibrium in pure strategies (by the firms) exists. This result stands in contrast to the case of unlimited capacity. The utility level is uniquely determined in equilibrium. No rationing occurs in equilibrium, but it does off the equilibrium path. Received: December 29, 1999; revised version: November 30, 2000