Credit supply and corporate innovation

We present evidence that banking development plays a key role in technological progress. We focus on manufacturing firms' innovative performance, measured by patent-based metrics, and employ exogenous variations in banking development arising from the staggered deregulation of banking activities across US states during the 1980s and 1990s. We find that interstate banking deregulation had significant beneficial effects on the quantity and quality of innovation activities, especially for firms highly dependent on external capital and located closer to entering banks. Furthermore, we find that these results are strongly driven by a greater ability of deregulated banks to geographically diversify credit risk.     

Investor base and corporate borrowing: Evidence from international bonds

We examine international bond issues by US firms to study the benefits of investor taste for cross-border security issuances. We proxy for firms' international investor taste with the fraction of prior international bond holding in firms' domestic and international bonds and find that international investor demand increases with such taste. Moreover, the offering yield spreads on international bonds are lower than domestic offering yield spreads for these internationally recognized firms and they have higher probability of issuing internationally. Such international recognition may occur, for instance, if the diversification benefits of adding the security to investor's portfolio outweigh the negative effects of higher renegotiation costs for international compared to domestic investors.     

The effects of global leniency programs on margins and mergers

In a cross‐country study, we investigate how staggered passage of national leniency programs from 1990–2012 has affected firms’ margins and merger activity. We find that these programs, which give amnesty to cartel conspirators that cooperate with antitrust authorities, reduced the gross margins of the affected firms. However, firms reacted to new regulations by engaging in more mergers that had negative effects on downstream firms. Our results imply that although these programs were generally effective, their full potential was mitigated by mergers that substitute for cartels, and that a strong merger review process might be a prerequisite for strengthening anti‐collusion enforcement.