The Role of Sales in NPD: An Investigation of the U.S. Health‐Care Industry

The new product development (NPD) literature emphasizes that the success of new products strongly depends on a firm's capability to understand customer needs and translate them into new products. Because of their close relationships with customers, salespeople are in the ideal position to connect the firm's NPD efforts to its customers. The extant literature on the role of sales in NPD focuses on either sales’ contribution to generating new product ideas or the adoption of new products by salespeople, while a systematic study of sales’ contribution during all NPD stages is lacking. In addition, the role of sales is typically studied in isolation, while in practice, the role of sales depends on the relationship between sales and marketing. This article addresses these gaps in the literature by reporting on an empirical investigation of the role of sales during the entire NPD process in the U.S. health‐care industry, taking into account the complexities of the sales‐marketing dynamic. The article is based on interviews with 21 sales and 15 marketing informants from the U.S. health‐care industry, both pharmaceutical firms (selling drugs to physicians) and device manufacturing firms. Our findings highlight how salespeople are distant from NPD process during the discovery stage. Salespeople are focused on selling to customers, and marketing keeps sales distant from the NPD process. During the development stage, sales is still only indirectly involved in NPD through its relationship with marketing. During commercialization, however, marketing takes the driver's seat and strongly involves sales in the various (pre)launch activities. But while salespeople are mostly indirectly involved in NPD, sales managers have a closer relationship with sales and are more directly involved. The findings also show how the involvement of sales is influenced by characteristics of the health‐care industry. Thus, this article contributes to our understanding of the role of sales in NPD by integrating theoretical perspectives from the sales‐marketing interface literature into the NPD literature.     

A Repeated Game Model of Monetary Union

Given a policy rule of the common central bank of a monetary union, member countries with different preferences about inflation and facing asymmetric shocks have different incentives to secure political intervention in the bank's operation and achieve the temporary benefit of surprise inflation. This is modelled as a repeated game, and the most cooperative outcome subject to the countries' incentive compatibility constraints is found. The optimal rule responds flexibly to asymmetric shocks, adjusting policy away from the full commitment level toward the discretionary level, so as to maintain the worse-hit country's incentive to abide by the rule.     

Oligopoly and welfare: A unified presentation with applications to trade and development

We develop a unified sequence of models to examine the determinants of price, output, profitability and concentration for different kinds of oligopolistic market. We relate various magnitudes of significance to judges of welfare and to policy makers, such as consumer surplus, profit, or added benefits of employment or trade surplus, to observable magnitudes such as the size and concentration of the market. It emerges that various appropriately formulated Herfindahl indices are useful in several of these relations. We attempt to present results in a way that is useful for empirical investigations and pay particular attention to applications in trade and development.     

Voluntary pricing mechanisms for green product purchase: altruistic versus self-enhancing consideration

Voluntary pricing mechanisms, such as Pay-What-You-Want (PWYW), could be a better pricing strategy to substitute for cash discount promotions. They can effectively promote the sales of conventional goods and services, while being influenced by socio-psychological variables. However, there is no clarity on the relative assessment of the impact of pricing frames, such as PWYW and Mark-Off-Your-Own-Price (MOYOP), on the consumers’ purchase of green products, where the purchase consideration might vary as the environment protection (altruistic) consideration versus the self-interest (self-enhancing) consideration. Further, there remains ambiguity on when and why such pricing mechanisms will work. This study, through an experiment, examines the buyers’ varied responses for the PWYW price frame versus the MOYOP price frame versus the fixed price frame under the environment protection (altruistic) consideration versus the self-interest (self-enhancing) consideration. It shows that although buyers do not show any difference in the mean voluntary payment between PWYW versus MOYOP frames as such; they prefer PWYW price frame under the environment protection (altruistic) consideration and MOYOP price frame under the self-interest (self-enhancing) consideration. The results show that the perception of price fairness mediates the relationship between pricing mechanism and willingness to buy (WTB). Furthermore, this study finds that price consciousness impacts the indirect effect of pricing mechanisms on WTB via perceived price fairness. The present study is the first to examine and analyze different considerations when the buyers’ preference varied for the PWYW versus MOYOP pricing frames. This study has suggested the underlying role of the perception of price fairness and price consciousness in the participative pricing mechanism on purchase.     

人民币继续升值并非出路

最近,美国财政部长约翰·斯诺(John Snow)强烈要求中国进一步放宽人民币的每日交易区间,他强调,人民币升值是调整全球失衡必不可少的一部分.赤字国家的许多评论员也持相同观点,当然,最热切的是全美制造商协会(National Association of US Manufacturers).多数人主张,美国也必须削减财政赤字,但如果削减赤字的同时,亚洲的货币却没升值,那么世界将陷入衰退.言下之意是,亚洲应该先履行自己的义务.从基本上未被重视的亚洲角度看,这种惬意的共识是错误、自私和危险的.     

Governance Reforms and Growth: Some Ideas from Economic Theory

Ideas from the theory of incentives and organization are deployed to examine how some aspects of economic governance—primarily protection of property rights, enforcement of contracts, and oversight regulation—can be improved for achieving better economic growth and development. Some suggestions for reform of governance institutions in developing countries are offered.     

Business-to-Business Negotiations: The Role of Relativism,Deceit, and Opportunism

Purpose: Studies examining the impact of relativism and deceitful tendencies on unethical negotiation tactics have yielded inconsistent results; some studies report a positive relationship, some negative, while some others report a nonexistent relationship between these constructs. These inconsistencies suggest that there may be intervening variables mediating the effects of these factors on unethical negotiation tactics. We propose that opportunism plays an important role in determining the effects of these two antecedents on business managers' perceptions of unethical negotiation tactics.

Method: An Internet-based survey was administered to a sample of managers at U.S. firms engaged in business-to-business marketing. Structural equation modeling techniques were used to evaluate the mediating role of opportunism between deceitful tendencies and relativism on questionable negotiation tactics.

Findings: The analysis supports the hypothesized role of opportunism as a mediating variable. Opportunism was found to play a significant role in mediating the relationships of both relativism and deceitful tendencies on attitudes toward unethical negotiation tactics.

Contribution: In addition to the theoretical contributions suggested here, this article includes suggestions for minimizing the likelihood that a negotiation partner's relativism and deceitful tendencies will negatively impact business negotiation.     

Promotional Framing of Green Products: Mediating Role of Sale Proneness

Abstract

The impact of sales promotion in boosting short-term sales is well established in the literature. While there are ample studies on the impact of sales promotion on conventional products in western countries, there is very scant research on the effect of promotions on green products and almost nonexistence research in emerging economies. This research addresses this gap by doing a comparative assessment of economically equivalent bonus pack sales promotion and price discount sales promotions on green versus non-green products through two experiments designed as a 2 (green product motivation: hedonic vs. utilitarian) × 2 (promotional frame: price discount vs. bonus pack) × 2 (discount level: low vs. high) between-subjects study, and 2 ( product types: green, non-green/control) × 2(promotional frame: price discount, bonus pack) between-subjects study. This research further examines the mediating role of sale proneness in the purchase process. The findings of this research indicate that buyers' preferences for promotion are quite varied for the purchase of green versus non-green products, and the price discount increases sale proneness which exerts a negative impact on product purchase willingness. Accordingly, this study has some theoretical and practical implications.     

On Rybczynski's theorem in a setting of growth

This note re-examines earlier work by Petith on a two-sector economy in steady state growth facing constant world prices. It is shown that a steady state with higher saving propensities out of wages or profits has a higher output of the capital good per head, and greater exports of it compared to the no-trade equilibrium, if and only if the capital good is more capital-intensive. Petith's example yielding counterintuitive results is shown to be in error.     

Redesigning Regulation of Pensions and Other Financial Products

We observe that financial regulation is ever-growing, with thelatest area to experience increased supervisory attention beingpensions. Yet this has not made the financial world or consumerssafer, and for pensions in particular there are unexpected andundesired consequences. We explore the current policy approachto supervision, which is ‘bottom up’, i.e. assessmentand regulation of individual institutions, with the aim ofmakingthe financial system safe by making each institution safe. Weshow that this is both damaging (because it stifles innovation)and does not work (because risk will always be squeezed fromthe regulated institutions to the less regulated and less seen).Instead, we advocate a ‘top-down’ approach, whichfocuses on making the system safe first. We conclude that onceyou have made systems safe, detailed supervision of individualinstitutions is less necessary, thus reducing the burden ofsupervision. We believe that this approach will lead to a moresuitable and diverse treatment of different risks that willincrease both systemic and consumer safety. ‘If you haveten thousand regulations you destroy all respect for the law’,Winston Churchill (1931). ‘The ultimate result of shieldingmen from the effects of folly is to fill the world with fools’,Herbert Spencer (1891). Footnotes ¹ E-mail addresses: n.barr{at}lse.ac.uk; john_nugee{at}ssga.com