The Signaling Effect of Tax Policy

The paper focuses on the signaling value of a tax when agents are less informed than the government on the effect of their consumption. The policy making process is analyzed as a game in which the government wants to influence consumers' behaviors through tax policy, consumers being rational and Bayesian. The marginal cost of public funds induces the government to provide biased information to pursue budgetary objectives. We analyze the tax distortion that is required for credibility.     

Banking Deregulation and Industry Structure: Evidence from the French Banking Reforms of 1985

We investigate how the deregulation of the French banking industry in the 1980s affected the real behavior of firms and the structure and dynamics of product markets. Following deregulation, banks are less willing to bail out poorly performing firms and firms in the more bank‐dependent sectors are more likely to undertake restructuring activities. At the industry level, we observe an increase in asset and job reallocation, an improvement in allocative efficiency across firms, and a decline in concentration. Overall, these findings support the view that a more efficient banking sector helps foster a Schumpeterian process of “creative destruction.”     

Information Disclosure,Cognitive Biases,and Payday Borrowing

Can psychology‐guided information disclosure induce borrowers to lower their use of high‐cost debt? In a field experiment at payday stores, we find that information that makes people think less narrowly (over time) about finance costs results in less borrowing. In particular, reinforcing the adding‐up dollar fees incurred when rolling over loans reduces the take‐up of future payday loans by 11% in the subsequent 4 months. Although we remain agnostic as to the overall sufficiency of better disclosure policy to “remedy” payday borrowing, we cast the 11% reduction in borrowing in light of the relative low cost of this policy.     

CAN AGGREGATION ACROSS GOODS BE ACHIEVED BY NEGLECTING THE PROBLEM? PROPERTY INHERITANCE AND AGGREGATION BIAS*

This article studies the problem of composite commodity in two different frameworks. In one case, aggregation across goods is analyzed for elementary goods that satisfy an optimality condition. The unrestricted case is also examined. The notion of an approximate aggregate representation is formalized and shown to be always possible. Can thereby aggregation issues simply be neglected in economic contributions? I show that the standard economic properties of initial functions are not necessarily inherited by the approximate aggregate. The severity of this problem and the size of the aggregation bias across inputs are investigated empirically.     

Resource Use under Climate Stabilization: Can Nuclear Power Provide Clean Energy?

The long‐term goal of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is the stabilization of carbon concentration in the atmosphere. In this paper, we impose a carbon target concentration on a partial equilibrium model of the global energy sector. Specifically, we ask whether nuclear power can provide carbon‐free energy as fossil fuel resources become costly due to scarcity and externality costs. We find that nuclear power can reduce the cost of generating clean energy significantly and relatively quickly. However, beyond a few decades the role of nuclear power may be considerably reduced as uranium becomes scarce and renewables become economical. The cost of carbon when nuclear power supplies a significant share of energy is much lower than that of other studies. A policy implication is that current political and regulatory impediments to the expansion of nuclear generation may prove to be costly if large volumes of clean energy need to be supplied over a relatively short period of time.