Auditing in the Presence of Outside Sources of Information

We examine how an auditor's ability to terminate a multi-period client relationship provides the auditor with a real option whose value depends on the nature of informational asymmetry between the incumbent and other potential auditors. In particular, we isolate conditions under which the auditor's private and public sources of information behave as complements rather than substitutes. In such circumstances, increasing the likelihood of publicly provided information induces the auditor to expend more (rather than less)resources in private information gathering activities.     

On the corporate use of green bonds

When do wholesalers issue green bonds to finance their socially responsible activities instead of charging a premium for the products they produce? We show that in less competitive retail markets when retailers can “skim” more of the premium that end consumers pay for socially responsible products, green bonds provide additional funds to help cover the cost of a wholesaler's socially responsible activities. Similar incentives arise if the wholesaler's input is a small component of the end consumers’ product, or if it is difficult for end consumers to identify the wholesaler's socially responsible activities.     

Reg-FD and the competitiveness of all-star analysts

We examine the impact of Regulation Fair Disclosure on the competitive advantage of All-Star analysts as measured by turnover in the rankings. Institutional Investor All-Americans, chosen by votes of institutional investors based on overall helpfulness, experienced a significant increase in turnover as Reg-FD was implemented. Non-US analysts and US analysts ranked solely on the basis of public stock recommendations did not. Within a few years, however, All-American turnover returned to pre-Reg-FD levels, suggesting that the new All-Americans built a competitive advantage stressing aspects of performance less dependent on privileged communication.     

Selling to Socially Responsible Consumers: Competition and The Private Provision of Public Goods

We model firms as competing for socially responsible consumers by linking the provision of a public good (environmentally friendly or socially responsible activities) to sales of their private goods. In many cases, too little of the public good is provided, but under certain conditions, competition leads to excessive provision. Further, there is generally a trade-off between more efficient provision of the private and the public good. Our results indicate that the level of private provision of the public good varies inversely with the competitiveness of the private-good market and that the types of public goods provided are biased toward those for which consumers have high participation value.     

Stock repurchase as a takeover defense

We develop a model in which stock repurchases serve as a defenseagainst takeovers by signaling the manager's private informationabout the value of the firm. The manager repurchases sharesto block a takeover only if the cost of doing so is not toohigh. Since the cost is inversely related to the value of thefirm under his management, a repurchase signals that the valueof the stock is high, blocking a takeover. While a repurchaseincreases the expected value of the stock, it also makes tostock riskier. The model also implies that there are too fewtakeovers for efficiency.     

Family firms, debtholder�Cshareholder agency costs and the use of covenants in private debt

We ask whether the private debt contracts of family firms contain more restrictive covenants tied to accounting numbers than those of non-family firms. Our examination of Dealscan data indicates that credit agreements of Standard and Poor (S&P) 500 family firms are more likely to include accounting-based covenants that limit the lender(s)’ risk that managers will divert cash or assets to shareholders than those of S&P 500 non-family firms. The likelihood is further increased by presence of a dual class stock system that includes supervoting shares. Our results suggest that lenders are more willing to rely on accounting-based covenants to solve the shareholder–private lender agency problem in family firms given that the reporting quality is higher due to better alignment of owner and manager interests in such firms.     

Analyst estimation revision clusters and corporate events, Part II

Summary In Part I of this study, we evaluated the relative usefulness of information in alternative corporate information events (CIEs) to analysts by examining the frequency with which they trigger clusters of analysts’ earnings estimate revisions. In Part II, we examine investor response to various CIEs and their revision clusters. We find that stock prices react most strongly and adjust most quickly to revision clusters that accompany CIEs that focus on financial statement information. CIEs that offer strategic information take longer for analysts and investors to assimilate, and investors appear to rely heavily on later analyst revisions following such events.     

Buyers' and sellers' agents in the housing market

We explain why buyers in the housing market use an agent employed by the seller. Such agents reduce buyers' search costs so that more buyers search a particular house. This increases the probability of the sale of the house and possibly also its selling price. However, since the selling price increases, if at all, by less than the fee paid by the seller to the agent, both buyers and sellers are better off. We identify two characteristics that give rise to sellers' agents and show that markets that do not have such agents are missing at least one of these characteristics.     

Analyst estimation revision clusters and corporate events,Part I

Summary This paper uses periods of unusually heavy earnings estimate revision activity by analysts to assess the relative usefulness of corporate information events (CIEs) in firm valuation. Because accounting information is more readily available, newsworthy and accessible, we hypothesize that CIEs that focus on financial statement information trigger greater analyst revision activity over a shorter period of time than CIEs that offer strategic or “soft” information. Our results are consistent with this hypothesis. In Part II, we examine investor response to revision clusters that accompany different CIEs.We thank the Editor, an anonymous referee, Joe Cooper, Todd Doersch, Tony Greig, Kent Konkol and Marc Sievers for helpful suggestions and discussions. We also thank Mehmet Ozbilgin and James Su for programming during the planning phase of this project, and Jinyoung Park for research assistance during its execution. We are very grateful to Thomson Financial, CCBN and Reuters Data for providing data used in this study. Bagnoli and Watts thank the Krannert Graduate School of Management andPurdue University for financial support.