Reevaluation of Revaluations: A Cross-Country Examination of the Motives and Effects on Future Performance

Abstract:  This study examines the motives for asset revaluations in a sample drawn from 35 countries that permit asset revaluations. Prior studies that examined this issue concentrated on one or two countries, the UK and Australia, and showed that revaluations are related to financing needs, the capital intensity of the firm as well as issues related to political costs. The previous literature also found that revaluations were indicators of improved future performance and that performance was related to the magnitude of the revaluations. This study shows that although the conclusions drawn from the previous studies are applicable to countries that are similar to the UK and Australia, they do not hold when applied to a much larger set of countries and that the motivations for and effects of revaluation are not uniform across various country classifications.     

ADVANCE PAYMENTS DURING INFLATIONARY PERIODS

During periods of rismg prices, contracts for future delivery of merchandise are usually linked to a price index to protect suppliers from future cost increases, and customers, therefore, advance payments to avoid the price linkage. Suppliers are then faced with two problems: (i) the investment of advance payments and (ii) the presentation of the investment outcome in the fimancial reports. This paper uses a portfolio selection process to analyse the suppliers' investment decisions, and shows that the accounting presentation depends on the particular investment decision, which in turn affects the principalagent relationship. Suggestions are made to eliminate the undesirable effects of this relationap on management's decision making.     

MISUSE AND OPTIMUM INSPECTING STRATEGY IN AGENCY PROBLEMS

Assets misuse by an agent and the optimal audit inspecting strategy are analyzed in this paper. The agent and the principal are acting to maximize their expected utility and both are characterized by risk aversion. The agent's decision about a theft takes into account the probability of benefiting from the stolen assets but also the probability of being penalized if caught. The principal's decision about the optimal number of audit teams, hence, the probability of uncovering the theft, takes into account the cost involved, the probability of one team of auditors uncovering the theft and the agent's decision about the theft. We get two response curves which describe the optimal behavior of both the agent and the principal and show that there may be a Nash solution to the problem. Since in real life there are often many principals (shareholders) with different utility functions, a set of efficient strategies is offered using the First and Second degree Stochastic Dominance rules. A numerical illustration which clarifies the methodology and displays the applicability of the model is also provided.