STRUCTURAL CHANGE AND PROSPECTS FOR SUSTAINED IMPROVEMENT IN U.S. EXTERNAL BALANCE

Projections from many macroeconometric models have suggested that the improving trend in U.S. external balance since 1987 would peter out by the end of 1990. Because the 1980s decade was a turbulent period in the international environment, one might question the reliability of these projections since the economic relationships underlying the models could have changed. This review finds insufficient evidence of structural change or of sufficiently important omitted variables to justify seriously questioning the projections. However, this study also considers model and parameter uncertainty and concludes that continued improvement in U.S. external balance is within the realm of statistical probability—but, then, so is substantial worsening.     

Seasonality Estimation in Thin Markets

The greater availability of daily data in the U.S. has led to a number of studies of the seasonality of daily stock (index) returns. While the studies recognized the potential impacts of nontrading and price-adjustment delays in general, no formal analyses of such impacts were presented; in this paper analytic results are presented for the articulation between these phenomena. The implications of the analysis are discussed and shown to be consistent with a sample of U.K. index data. A modified form of the negative weekend effect is found to be present in the U.K. data analyzed.     

俄亥俄州立大学哥伦布分校和印第安那大学商学院公司治理和破产

很多公司治理专家和机构都提议，董事会应该有更大比例的独立董事以及CEO不应该拥有董事长职位这样一个二重身份。但是，实践中也有一些证据支持内部人控制董事会以及CEO二重身份的董事会。我们选择50个失败的公司和50个起点状况和它们差不多的有代表性的公司的数据，比较它们董事会的结构要素，确实发现缺少独立性的董事会是公司失败的最重要原因。我们的研究表明，二重身份CEO以及内部人控制的董事会更容易造成僵化，即僵化概率远高于外部人控制的董事会。     

Taking a View: Corporate Speculation, Governance, and Compensation

Using responses to a well‐known confidential survey, we study corporations' use of derivatives to “take a view” on interest rate and currency movements. Characteristics of speculators suggest that perceived information and cost advantages lead them to take positions actively; that is, they do not speculate to increase risk by “betting the ranch.” Speculating firms encourage managers to speculate through incentive‐aligning compensation arrangements and bonding contracts, and they use derivatives‐specific internal controls to manage potential abuse. Finally, we examine whether investors reading public corporate disclosures are able to identify firms that indicate speculating in the confidential survey; they are not.