Why Do Politicians Intervene in Accounting Regulation? The Role of Ideology and Special Interests

Politicians frequently intervene in the regulation of financial accounting. Evidence from the accounting literature shows that regulatory capture by special interests helps explain these interventions. However, many accounting rules have broad economic or social consequences, such as their effects on income distribution or private sector subsidies. The perception of these consequences varies with a politician's ideology. Therefore, if accounting rules produce those consequences, ideology plausibly spills over and explains a politician's stance on the technical accounting issue, beyond special interest pressure. We use two prominent U.S. political debates about fair value accounting and the expensing of employee stock options to disentangle the role of ideology from special interest pressure. In both debates, ideology explains politicians’ involvement at exactly those points when the debate focuses on the economic consequences of accounting regulation (i.e., bank bailouts and top management compensation). Once the debates focus on more technical issues, connections to special interests remain the dominant force.     

A Rational Expectations Equilibrium with Informative Trading Volume

A large number of empirical studies find that trading volume contains information about the distribution of future returns. While these studies indicate that observing volume is helpful to an outside observer of the economy it is not clear how investors within the economy can learn from trading volume. In this paper, I show how trading volume helps investors to evaluate the precision of the aggregate information in the price. I construct a model that offers a closed‐form solution of a rational expectations equilibrium where all investors learn from (1) private signals, (2) the market price, and (3) aggregate trading volume.     

Low-Risk Anomalies?

This paper shows that low-risk anomalies in the capital asset pricing model and in traditional factor models arise when investors require compensation for coskewness risk. Empirically, we find that option-implied ex ante skewness is strongly related to ex post residual coskewness, which allows us to construct coskewness factor-mimicking portfolios. Controlling for skewness renders the alphas of betting-against-beta and betting-against-volatility insignificant. We also show that the returns of beta- and volatility-sorted portfolios are driven largely by a single principal component, which in turn is explained largely by skewness.     

Financial Exposure and the International Transmission of Financial Shocks

This paper analyzes the transmission mechanism of banking sector shocks in an international real business cycle model with heterogeneous bank sizes. We examine to what extent the financial exposure of the banking sector affects the transmission of foreign banking sector shocks. In our model, the more exposed domestic banks are to the foreign economy via lending to foreign firms, the greater are the spillovers from foreign financial shocks to the home economy. The model highlights the role of openness to trade and the dynamics of the terms of trade in the international transmission mechanism of banking sector shocks: spillovers from foreign banking sector shocks are greater the more open the home economy is to trade and the less the terms of trade respond to foreign shocks.     

A Macrofinance View of U.S. Sovereign CDS Premiums

Premiums on U.S. sovereign credit default swaps (CDS) have risen to persistently elevated levels since the financial crisis. We examine whether these premiums reflect the probability of a fiscal default—a state in which a balanced budget can no longer be restored by raising taxes or eroding the real value of debt by increasing inflation. We develop an equilibrium macrofinance model in which the fiscal and monetary policy stances jointly endogenously determine nominal debt, taxes, inflation, and growth. We show that the CDS premiums reflect the endogenous risk-adjusted probabilities of fiscal default. The calibrated model is consistent with elevated levels of CDS premiums but leaves dynamic implications quantitatively unresolved.     

The Impact of Liquidity Risk: A Fresh Look*

This paper takes a fresh look at the importance of liquidity risk using a comprehensive liquidity measure, weighted spread, in a Value‐at‐Risk (VaR) framework. The weighted spread measure extracts liquidity costs by order size from the limit order book. Using a unique, representative data set of 160 German stocks over 5.5 years, we show that liquidity risk is an important risk component. Actually, liquidity risk is increasing the total price risk by over 25%, even at 10‐day horizons and for liquid blue chip stocks and especially in larger, yet realistic order sizes beyond €1 million. When correcting for liquidity risk, it is commonly assumed that liquidity risk can be simply added to price risk. Our empirical results show that this is not correct, as the correlation between liquidity and price is non‐perfect and total risk is thus overestimated.     

Do Markets Care about Central Bank Governor Changes? Evidence from Emerging Markets

Based on a new daily data set for 20 emerging markets over the period 1992–2006, we examine the reactions of foreign exchange markets, domestic stock markets, and sovereign bond spreads to central bank governor changes. We find that the replacement of a central bank governor negatively affects financial markets on the announcement day, which is in line with the hypothesis that newly appointed central bank governors suffer from a systematic credibility problem at the beginning of their tenure. We also find some evidence that changes in perceived central bank independence affect markets.     

Money Laundering as a Crime in the Financial Sector: A New Approach to Quantitative Assessment,with an Application to Italy

This study provides an answer to the question of how much cash deposited via a financial institution can be traced back to criminal activities, by developing a new approach to measure money laundering and proposing an application to Italy. We define a model of cash in‐flows on current accounts considering, besides “dirty money” to be laundered, also the legal motivations to deposit cash and the role of the shadow economy. We find that the average amount of cash laundered in Italy is around 6% of GDP. These findings are coherent with estimates of the nonobserved economy obtained in previous studies.