Equilibrium dominance in experimental financial markets

We examine the predictive power of equilibrium dominance inexperimental markets where firms with investment opportunitieshave an informational advantage over potential investors andare permitted to purchase a money-burning signal. Equilibriumdominance often fails to predict well when a Pareto-superiorsequential equilibrium is also available. Instead, equilibriumselection appears to be related to the potential earnings ofa more valuable firm that can signal its type successfully bydefecting from the sequential equilibrium.     

留守儿童更信任他人吗?来自实验经济学的证据

文章采用经典的信任博弈框架,用实验经济学方法比较城市儿童、农村留守儿童和农村非留守儿童的信任行为。实验结果发现,农村留守儿童对他人的信任水平显著高于城市儿童,而农村留守儿童和非留守儿童的信任水平没有显著差异。在控制了性别、民族、兄弟姐妹数量等人口学特征后,农村身份对儿童的信任水平有显著正向影响,父母双方外出务工、一方外出务工对信任水平均无显著影响。从被信任度来看,三组儿童中,城市儿童被信任度最低,农村留守儿童被信任度最高,但考虑人口学特征后,农村身份、留守身份均不影响被信任度。结合儿童在利他实验中的表现,文章还发现在利他行为中表现为无私型的儿童比平等型和恶意型有更高的信任水平。研究结果表明与同年龄城市儿童相比,农村儿童而不仅是农村留守儿童更信任他人。     

Gender and generosity: does degree of anonymity or group gender composition matter?

Employing a two-by-two factorial design that manipulates whether dictator groups are single or mixed-sex and whether procedures are single or double-blind, we examine gender effects in a standard dictator game. No gender effects were found in any of the experimental treatments for the mean or median levels of giving, or for the propensity to give nothing. However, females chose to give away half of their endowments with greater frequency than males in the pooled single-sex treatments.     

Investment performance of Canadian real estate stocks using sharpe's performance index: A comment

This comment corrects three typographical errors contained in Achour et al. (1984). It also takes issue with their use and interpretation of multivariate tests in the context of a bivariate null hypothesis.     

Pooling, separating, and semiseparating equilibria in financial markets: some experimental evidence

This study investigates experimental financial markets in whichfirms possess more information than do potential investors.Firms were given opportunities to undertake positive net presentvalue projects which they could either forgo or finance by sellingequity. Auctions were conducted among the investors for theright to finance the projects. When the theoretical equilibriumwas unique, theory predicted well. When theory permitted pooling,separation, and semiseparation, only the more efficient poolingequilibrium was observed. The domination of the pooling equilibriumwas robust to different experimental experiences by participants.When available, signals were used by good firms to distinguishthemselves from bad.     

Tax compliance and obedience to authority at home and in the lab: A new experimental approach

In most experimental studies of tax evasion, participants are instructed that they may report any amount of income from zero up to the amount they actually earned or received. This amounts to an invitation to gamble. In contrast, real-world tax authorities unambiguously demand compliance. We develop two new settings for conducting tax experiments. Both involve an explicit demand for compliance. Thus, we can determine whether knowing that the experimental authority would regard evasion as wrongful disobedience will influence compliance decisions. We demonstrate that simply telling people that they are required to pay a “participation fee” analogous to a tax produces remarkably high compliance rates and less sensitivity to changes in economic variables than in the earlier experimental literature using invitation-to-gamble language. This suggests that many people pay taxes despite the financial attraction of non-compliance because they are strongly inclined towards obeying authority. Furthermore, we show that giving participants a week to make their reporting decisions at home without an authority figure physically present overcomes the inclination to obey for some people, significantly lowering compliance rates. However, the majority still complies, even after the audit rate falls from 25% to 1%, which would make non-compliance extremely attractive if it were viewed only as a simple matter of risk and expected return. Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at . JEL Classification C91, H26