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We examine time dependency in the factors motivating delistings of foreign firms from major U.S. Exchanges over the period 1962–2006. For firms listing before Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX), we find that governance has no significant effect on delisting but after SOX, it becomes one of the main forces driving delisting. For firms whose delisting decision is most likely attributable to SOX, we find they realize low benefits from listing – they originate from countries with strong home market governance, and from listing onward realize low trading volume, analyst coverage, and make little use of capital raising. Our results suggest that SOX has had a large influence on the benefits seek from a U.S. listing, leading firms from well governed countries and low capital raising needs to delist.  相似文献   
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We examine the in-roads commercial banks have made into equity underwriting over 1990–2002. While banks end the period handling upwards of 25% of equity underwriting, this increase results almost exclusively from acquisitions of investment banks with an already established market share of equity underwriting. We find a significant decline in the market share of equity underwriting that banks acquired in the post-merger period, a decline that is larger than that experienced by independent investment banks of comparable reputation. Banks lose market share because they originate fewer IPOs and their IPOs have a lower incidence of follow-on SEOs compared to independent investment banks. Following the merger, banks experience a large fall off in their ability to retain follow-on SEOs and are less successful in winning SEO mandates when an issuer switches from its IPO underwriter. Overall, the findings suggest it has been difficult for banks to achieve scope economies in equity underwriting.  相似文献   
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The Impact of Global Equity Offerings   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
This article examines the impact of U.S. firms issuing equity in multiple markets. We compare the stock price reactions to announcements of global equity offers to a control group of issues offered exclusively in the domestic U.S. market. All else equal, the adverse price reaction that typically accompanies equity issuance is reduced by 0.8 percent when some shares are sold abroad. The overall evidence suggests global offers are effective in expanding demand and reducing the price pressure effects associated with share issuance. The beneits of global offers appear to be associated with an increase in the number of foreign shareholders.  相似文献   
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Corporate debt sales have been regarded as 'no news' eventsbecause there is no significant price reaction on average totheir announcement. We explore the hypothesis that this lackof average price reaction to debt sale announcements is explainedby the partial anticipation of debt offers. Theory suggeststhat the demand for debt capital is fundamentally related tochanges in the sources and uses of funds, and we find evidencethat earnings are significantly lower, investment growth issignificantly bigger, and, for some issuers, debt refundingrequirements are significantly greater in the period immediatelyprior to issue than in periods well before and after the issue.We find that this preissue information conditions investors'expectations of issue, thereby affecting the cross-sectionalannouncement date price reaction to debt sales in two ways.First, announcement date price reactions are negative, on average,for unanticipated offers or for those offers where prior informationsuggests that an issue is unlikely. Second, holding the probabilityof issue constant, announcement date price reactions are significantlymore negative for offers that raise more capital than investorsexpected. These results are consistent with cash flow signalingand asymmetric information models of corporate financings.  相似文献   
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