Type correlated equilibria for games with payoff uncertainty

Summary Aumann's notion of correlated equilibrium is extended to games with payoff uncertainty. A type correlated equilibrium is a correlated equilibrium for Harsanyi's game in player-types. An equivalent definition is a probability distribution over types and actions which is consistent with the prior distribution over types, such that when each player observes its type and action, the observed action is optimal and no further information about other players' types is obtained. Any such equilibrium can be implemented by a type-independent correlation device when players' observations may be type-dependent. The type correlated equilibrium correspondence is shown to be upperhemicontinuous with respect to player information.Support from NSF grant IRI-8609208 is gratefully acknowledged. I am grateful to Maxwell Stinchcombe for comments on an earlier draft of this paper. Any remaining errors are my own.     

Varying the VaR for unconditional and conditional environments

Accurate forecasting of risk is the key to successful risk management techniques. Using the largest stock index futures from 12 European bourses, this paper presents VaR measures based on their unconditional and conditional distributions for single and multi-period settings. These measures underpinned by extreme value theory are statistically robust explicitly allowing for fat-tailed densities. Conditional tail estimates accounting for volatility clustering are obtained by adjusting the unconditional extreme value procedure with GARCH filtered returns. The conditional modelling results in iid returns allowing for the use of a simple and efficient multi-period extreme value scaling law. The paper examines the properties of these distinct conditional and unconditional trading models. The paper finds that the biases inherent in unconditional single and multi-period estimates assuming normality extend to the conditional setting.     

An analysis of factors influencing asset writedowns

This study investigates the magnitude of total asset writedowns for a random sample of Australian industrial companies. We adopt an income strategy approach in operationalising our magnitude of writedowns construct to consider the set of accounting policies and negative accruals potentially available to managers. Our focus is on the incentives for and constraints on management to make asset writedowns. We find that the magnitude of writedowns observed are associated with managers' incentives to writedown impaired assets that have declined in value, as well as the firm's capacity to absorb the financial statement effects of the writedown. The number of senior management changes found to be associated with greater writedowns in prior studies is also supported in this study when only writedowns taken to the income statement are considered. The quality of corporate governance mechanisms does not vary systematically with the magnitude of writedowns.     

Spectral Risk Measures: Properties and Limitations

Spectral risk measures (SRMs) are risk measures that take account of user risk-aversion, but to date there has been little guidance on the choice of utility function underlying them. This paper addresses this issue by examining alternative approaches based on exponential and power utility functions. A number of problems are identified with both types of spectral risk measure. The general lesson is that users of spectral risk measures must be careful to select utility functions that fit the features of the particular problems they are dealing with, and should be especially careful when using power SRMs.