Entrepreneurial Structure Qualitative Analysis: The Case of Seville (Spain)

In the field of territorial economic growth, it is possible to identify important characteristics in the entrepreneurial structure, such as the structure of the size of firms, main activity sectors, or the degree of innovation. However, other lesser known characteristics are important also, such as functional dependency, which considers the relationship between small and medium enterprises (SMEs), and suppliers and clients belonging to any territorial field or productive dependency, which considers the level of concentration in terms of buying and selling in connection with the main suppliers and clients, respectively. In order to empirically contrast the importance of these entrepreneurial characteristics and try to relate them with territorial economic growth, a sample of 400 enterprises in the province of Seville (Spain) is used.      

Tracking Fraudulent and Low-Quality Display Impressions

Display advertising is traded in a complex market with multiple sides and intermediaries, where advertisers are exposed to several forms of potentially fraudulent behavior. Intermediaries often claim to implement measures to detect fraud but provide limited information about those measures. Advertisers are required to trust that self-regulation efforts effectively filter out low-quality ad impressions. In this article, we propose an approach for tracking key display impression metrics by embedding a light JavaScript code in the ad to collect the necessary information to help detect fraudulent activities. We explain these metrics using the campaign cost per thousand (CPT) and the number of impressions per publisher. We test the approach through six display ad campaigns. Our results provide a counterargument against the industry claim that it is effectively filtering out display fraud and show the utility of our approach for advertisers.     

Foreign Direct Investment in Mexico since the Approval of NAFTA

Cross-country panel data are used to assess the effect of free-tradeagreements on flows of foreign direct investment (FDI). Free-tradeagreements are found to have a significant positive effect onFDI flows, and free-trade agreements are found to matter morefor the smaller members of the agreement. For example, the NorthAmerican Free-Trade Agreement’s (NAFTA) effect on FDIflows into Mexico is much larger than its effect on flows intothe United States. These cross-country results are used to assessNAFTA’s effect on FDI flows into Mexico. After controllingfor a set of other factors—such as an increase in worldwideFDI flows—the trade agreement is found to generate FDIflows nearly 60 percent higher than they would have been withoutthe agreement.     

TAX BASIS AND NONLINEARITY IN CASH STREAM VALUATION

The value of a future cash stream is often taken to be its net present value with respect to some term structure. This means that a linear formula is used in which each future payment is discounted by a factor deemed appropriate for the date on which the payment will be made. In a money market with taxes and shorting costs, however, there is no theoretical support for the existence of a universal term structure for this purpose. What is worse, reliance on linear formulas can be seriously inaccurate relative to true worth and can lead to paradoxes of disequilibrium. A consistent no-arbitrage theory of valuation in such a market requires instead that taxed and untaxed investors be grouped in separate classes with different valuation operators. Such operators are linear to scale but nonlinear with respect to addition. Here it is established that although these valuation operators provide general bounds applicable across an entire class, individual investors within a tax class can have more special operators because of the influence of existing holdings. These customized valuation operators have the feature of not even being linear to scale. In consequence of this nonlinearity, investors from the same or different tax classes can undertake advantageous trades even when the market is in a no-arbitrage state, but such trade opportunities are limited. Some degree of activity in financial markets can thereby be understood without appeal to differences in utility functions or temporary disequilibrium due to random disturbances.     

Towards a Social Theory of Agency

We challenge critics of agency theory who suggest that agency theory's value does not extend outside a narrow context dominated by egocentric agents seeking only to maximize wealth at the expense of the principal. Instead, we argue that agency theory's flexibility allows for its application to a variety of non‐traditional settings where the key elements of agency theory, such as self‐interest, information asymmetry, and the mechanisms used to control agency costs can vary beyond the narrow assumptions implied in traditional agency‐based research. We suggest that extending agency theory to diverse settings using a deductive approach can be accomplished by formally recognizing and incorporating the institutional context surrounding principal–agent (P–A) relations into agency‐based models. Thus, criticisms that agency theory fails to acknowledge the social context in which P–A relations occur provides not a barrier but an opportunity for extending our understanding of P–A relations to a variety of diverse contexts.     

How social capital and knowledge affect innovation

This research analyzes the effects of interorganizational links on radical innovation using a comprehensive framework that integrates three research streams: social capital, the knowledge-based view and innovation. Incorporating data from 143 companies of innovative manufacturing and service industries, our results show that while knowledge complexity per se exerts a clear influence on radical innovation, the effect of knowledge tacitness appears only in combination with social capital. Similarly, the mere existence of strong cooperation agreements (relational social capital) does not guarantee more radical innovations, only when combining high levels of social capital with tacit knowledge does this antecedent produce more radical innovation.     

Incentives Management During Privatization: An Agency Perspective

abstract    This paper explains, through a field study and from an agency perspective, how monitoring and incentive alignment mechanisms change to support the interests of a privatized firm's new ownership. In this case, privatization led to important changes in the board of directors and to more formal performance evaluation and compensation systems for top managers, as profitability and financial control gained relevancy with the firm ownership change. Our results show that differences in incentives management before and after privatization are due to different agency relations in the two periods. We also argue that in a privatization framework the relation between monitoring and incentive alignment mechanisms is complex, not simply substitutive as agency theory would predict, and this finding allows us to refine and extend agency theory for this specific context.     

The Role of Ethics in Economics and Management: Galbraith–Drucker approaches

Ethics has been linked to virtue, considering it within an individual sphere. It has also been related to good social behaviour or even religious factors, and so on. In general, economic thinkers have not questioned some of the basic principles which help to shape the fundamental ethical criteria in economic behaviour. The pursuit of individual interest has been identified as pecuniary profit maximization and, in this sense, Peter Drucker states that this has been the fundamental motivation of any economic agent, even before capitalism was born and Galbraith pointed out that the lack of consideration of other motivations, apart from earning money, has been one of the biggest mistakes in economics. The main goal of this paper is to analyse the Drucker and Galbraith approaches on ethics.      

Cash Stream Valuation In the Face of Transaction Costs and Taxes

The usual notion of every future cash stream having a net present value determined from a single term structure breaks down when transaction costs are taken into account, especially the sizable costs associated with short-borrowing. the difficulties are compounded by taxes, which can lead to paradoxes of disequilibrium if elementary NPV is assumed to be a rational basis for decision making. This paper systematically develops a theory of valuation which overcomes these shortcomings by accepting the multiplicity of no-arbitrage term structures that may be present for each tax class of investors, and uses the entire set of them to impute both a "long price" and a "short price" for every cash stream, regardless of the sign of the future payments. the valuation operators giving these prices are nonlinear but readily calculated from linear programming formulas.