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We provide preliminary evidence, consistent with Skinner (1995), that Canada's relatively principles‐based GAAP yield higher accrual quality than the United States' relatively rules‐based GAAP. These results stem from a comparison of the Dechow‐Dichev (2002) measure of accrual quality for cross‐listed Canadian firms reporting under both Canadian and U.S. GAAP. However, we document lower accrual quality for Canadian firms reporting under U.S. GAAP than for U.S. firms, which are subject to stronger U.S. oversight, reporting under U.S. GAAP. The latter results suggest that stronger U.S. oversight compensates for inferior accrual quality associated with rules‐based GAAP. Consistent with the positive effect of Canada's principles‐based GAAP and the offsetting negative effect of Canada's weaker oversight, we find no overall difference in accrual quality between Canadian firms reporting under Canadian GAAP and U.S. firms reporting under U.S. GAAP. Our results imply that (1) policymakers who wish to compare the effectiveness of oversight across jurisdictions must control for the GAAP effect; and (2) accounting standard‐setters who wish to compare the effectiveness of principles‐ versus rules‐based GAAP must control for oversight strength. 相似文献
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DANIEL S. HAMERMESH 《劳资关系》1976,15(1):111-114
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DANIEL CARVALHO 《The Journal of Finance》2014,69(2):577-609
Using plant‐level data for Brazilian manufacturing firms, this paper provides evidence that government control over banks leads to significant political influence over the real decisions of firms. I find that firms eligible for government bank lending expand employment in politically attractive regions near elections. These expansions are associated with additional (favorable) borrowing from government banks. Further, these persistent expansions take place just before competitive elections, and are associated with lower future employment growth by firms in other regions. The analysis suggests that politicians in Brazil use bank lending to shift employment towards politically attractive regions and away from unattractive regions. 相似文献
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SNAKE RIVER SALMON RECOVERY: QUANTIFYING THE COSTS 总被引:4,自引:0,他引:4
DANIEL D. HUPPERT 《Contemporary economic policy》1999,17(4):476-491
Economic costs are relevant to endangered species protection in both theory and practice. Recovering endangered Snake River salmon will require modifying public land use, restricting fishing and hatchery production, reducing water for agriculture, and altering the operation of hydroelectric dams. The economic costs are estimated to range from $246 million to $359 million per year. While the estimated cost is not matched by the estimated increased value of fishing, the nonuse value of salmon recovery may be very large. Better economic and biological information is needed to assure that decisions for salmon species protection are reasonably cost effective. ( JEL Q28, H43) 相似文献
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Robust institutional change is difficult to achieve. However, it is more difficult for some countries than others. We use data on 69 countries between 1870 and 2000 to show that political instability does not always affect growth outcomes. We then develop a simple model to explain this fact in which the likelihood that “good” institutions are abandoned during periods of political uncertainty depends on the opportunity cost of doing so. We operationalize our model by using contract intensive money as a proxy for this initial investment in growth‐enhancing institutions. Cross‐sectional and panel growth regressions support the model's predictions. 相似文献
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