The Dynamics of Financially Constrained Arbitrage

We develop a model in which financially constrained arbitrageurs exploit price discrepancies across segmented markets. We show that the dynamics of arbitrage capital are self‐correcting: following a shock that depletes capital, returns increase, which allows capital to be gradually replenished. Spreads increase more for trades with volatile fundamentals or more time to convergence. Arbitrageurs cut their positions more in those trades, except when volatility concerns the hedgeable component. Financial constraints yield a positive cross‐sectional relationship between spreads/returns and betas with respect to arbitrage capital. Diversification of arbitrageurs across markets induces contagion, but generally lowers arbitrageurs' risk and price volatility.     

Breaking Collusion in Auctions through Speculation: An Experiment on CO2 Emission Permit Markets

The European Emission Trading Scheme (EU‐ETS) has chosen to adopt an auctioning procedure to initially allocate CO₂ emission permits. Free allocation of permits will become an exception for the third phase (2013–2020) and most firms will have to buy all their permits on the market or via auctions. The ability of bidders to collude is a key concern about the design of the auction format. To counter collusion, the auction can be open to bidders without compliance obligations (speculators). This paper aims at studying experimentally speculation as a collusion‐breaking device in two different auction mechanisms: the uniform‐price sealed‐bid auction and the ascending clock auction. Our results suggest that a uniform sealed‐bid auction open to speculators should be chosen from a revenue maximization point of view. In this mechanism, compliance agents adopt an aggressive strategy toward speculators. This strategy significantly increases the seller's revenue, compared to the more collusive clock auction. In the latter, on the contrary, bidders accommodate speculators, letting them buy permits in the auction and buying their necessary permits on the secondary market. However, as opening the auction to speculators deteriorates efficiency, the regulator faces a trade‐off between these two objectives.     

Performance Changes Following Top Management Dismissals

We document that forced resignations of top managers are preceded by large and significant declines in operating performance and followed by large improvements in performance. However, forced resignations are rare and are due more often to external factors (e.g., blockholder pressure, takeover attempts, etc.) than to normal board monitoring. Following the management change, these firms significantly downsize their operations and are subject to a high rate of corporate control activity. Normal retirements are followed by small increases in operating income and are also subject to a slightly higher than normal incidence of postturnover corporate control activity.     

Capital Maintenance Adjustment Under the Financial (Real) Capital Concept

This paper examines the way in which the general purchasing concept of capital has been implemented in the real business income and selling price models. It presents an analysis of the conceptual aspects of the alternative methods of implementation proposed in the literature and identifies limitations in adjusting for inflation in entry price models.     

Globalization of R&D and China: An Introduction

In this introduction, we discuss the recent changes in multinational corporations' (MNCs) research and development (R&D) strategies and China's rising role in this new development. Significant changes include: 1) More and more corporations have started overseas R & D operations; 2) the missions of many overseas R&D facilities have shifted from the traditional supplementing and supporting roles to become critical and strategic components of MNCs' global R&D networks; and 3) MNC overseas R&D operations have expanded their geographic reach to carefully selected developing countries. China has benefited from such changes and has become one major attraction for such R&D facilities due to its rich endowment of low-cost and well- trained scientists and engineers as well as its fast growing domestic market and burgeoning foreign investment in manufacturing. The explosion of foreign R&D investment has also been accompanied by the rapid growth of China's domestic investment in R&D. The growth in both domestic and foreign investment in R&D implies that China will improve its position in global economic and technological competition. However, it is unclear to the rest of the world about the implications of China's rising R&D and whether or not China can capture the value from the presence of foreign R&D centres. We conclude that issues related to China's science and technology development in general and foreign R&D in China in particular warrant more research in the future.     

Trade Restrictiveness and Pollution

This paper proposes a trade restrictiveness indicator that explicitly incorporates environmental externalities. The index employs directional distance functions and uses indicators (i.e., differences rather than ratios) modified to account for and evaluate efficiency changes in the face of simultaneous and multidimensional trade and environmental policy reforms. The index is made up of two components, one for production and one for consumption. Our overall trade restrictiveness indicator is accordingly the difference of the two. The properties of the indicator are developed and discussed together with its estimation.     

Divisional Managers and Internal Capital Markets

Using hand‐collected data on divisional managers at S&P 500 firms, we study their role in internal capital budgeting. Divisional managers with social connections to the CEO receive more capital. Connections to the CEO outweigh measures of managers' formal influence, such as seniority and board membership, and affect both managerial appointments and capital allocations. The effect of connections on investment efficiency depends on the tradeoff between agency and information asymmetry. Under weak governance, connections reduce investment efficiency and firm value via favoritism. Under high information asymmetry, connections increase investment efficiency and firm value via information transfer.