A NON‐PARAMETRIC MEASURE OF POVERTY ELASTICITY

We estimate the growth elasticity of poverty (GEP) using recently developed non‐parametric panel methods and the most up‐to‐date and extensive poverty data from the World Bank, which exceeds 500 observations in size and represents more than 96 percent of the developing world's population. Unlike previous studies which rely on parametric models, we employ a non‐parametric approach which captures the non‐linearity in the relationship between growth, inequality, and poverty. We find that the growth elasticity of poverty is higher for countries with fairly equal income distributions, and declines in nations with greater income disparities. Moreover, when controlling for differences in estimation technique, we find that the reported values of the GEP in the literature (based on the World Bank's now‐defunct 1993‐PPP based poverty data) are systematically larger in magnitude than estimates based on the latest 2005‐PPP based data.     

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF U.S. FOREIGN AID: AMERICAN LEGISLATORS AND THE DOMESTIC POLITICS OF AID

Are there systematic political economy factors that shape preferences for foreign aid, a key component of American foreign policy? We analyze votes in the House of Representatives from 1979 to 2003 that would increase or decrease foreign aid by considering the political, economic, and ideological characteristics of legislators and their districts. To understand who supports and opposes foreign aid, we utilize theories of foreign economic policy preferences. By examining different types of aid policy, we show that domestic politics and especially the distributional consequences of economic aid can matter. The economic characteristics of a district and its left–right ideological predispositions influence support for aid in a systematic fashion over the nearly 25‐year period. Stolper–Samuelson models along with political ideology can help explain legislators' preferences toward aid.