Analyst Hype in IPOs: Explaining the Popularity of Bookbuilding

The bookbuilding IPO procedure has captured significant marketshare from auction alternatives recently, despite the significantlylower costs related to the auction mechanism. In France, whereboth mechanisms were used in the 1990s, the ostensible advantagesof bookbuilding were advertising-related benefits. Book-builtissues were more likely to be followed and positively recommendedby lead underwriters. Even nonunderwriters' analysts promotebook-built issues more in order to curry favor with the IPOunderwriter for allocations of future deals. Yet we do not observevaluation or post-IPO return differentials that suggest thesetypes of promotion have any value to the issuing firm.     

Analyst coverage,earnings management and financial development: An international study

Using data from 21 countries, this paper analyzes the relation among analyst coverage, earnings management and financial development in an international context. We document that the effectiveness of financial analysts as monitors increases with a country’s financial development (FD). We find that in high-FD countries, increased within-firm analyst coverage results in less earnings management. Such is not the case in low-FD countries. Our results are economically significant and robust to reverse causality checks. Our findings illustrate one mechanism through which financial development mitigates the cost of monitoring firms and curbs earnings management.     

Auctioned IPOs: The US evidence

Between 1999 and 2007, WR Hambrecht completed 19 initial public offerings (IPOs) in the US using an auction mechanism. We analyze investor behavior and mechanism performance in these auctioned IPOs using detailed bidding data. The existence of some bids posted at high prices suggests that some investors (mostly retail) try to free-ride on the mechanism. But institutional demand in these auctions is very elastic, suggesting that institutional investors reveal information in the bidding process. Investor participation is largely predictable based on deal size, and demand is dominated by institutions. Flipping is at most as prevalent in auctions as in bookbuilt deals. But, unlike in bookbuilding, investors in auctions do not flip their shares more in “hot” deals. Finally, we find that institutional investors, who provide more information, are rewarded by obtaining a larger share of the deals that have higher 10-day underpricing. Our results therefore suggest that auctioned IPOs can be an effective alternative to traditional bookbuilding.