Managerial Ownership, Information Content of Earnings, and Discretionary Accruals in a Non–US Setting

This study employs Danish data to examine the empirical relationship between the proportion of managerial ownership and two characteristics of accounting earnings: the information content of earnings and the magnitude of discretionary accruals. In previous research concerning American firms, Warfield et al. (1995) document a positive relationship between managerial ownership and the information content of earnings, and a negative relationship between managerial ownership and discretionary accruals. We question the generality of the Warfield et al. result, as the ownership structure found in most other countries, including Denmark, deviates from the US ownership configuration. In fact, Danish data indicate that the information content of earnings is inversely related to managerial ownership.     

The response of long-term interest rates to news about monetary policy actions: Empirical evidence for the U.S. and Germany

The Response of Long-Term Interest Rates to News about Monetary Policy Actions. Empirical Evidence for the U.S. and Germany. — The authors reestimate the expectations theory of the term structure focusing on the question of how monetary policy actions indicated by changes in the very short rate affect long-term interest rates. Their main point is that the expectations hypothesis implies that very long rates should only react to unanticipated changes of the very short rate. In contrast to cointegration tests of expectations theory, this implication only requires rational expectations but not stationary risk premia. Therefore, its empirical test sheds new light on the importance of expectations theory for the determinants of the term structure of interest rates.     

Eine neue Typologie real existierender deutscher Erstversicherer

The Criterions of insurance companies in Germany are changing as consequences of market competition and regulation. Trends of differentiation follow former trends of assimilation. A modern typology of direct insurers resp. groups of insurers is less oriented by legal form of companies, more by targets of activities and stakeholder situation. In case of mutual companies there are effects of demutualization.     

Voluntary management earnings forecasts and discretionary accruals: evidence from Danish IPOs

This paper seeks to determine whether Danish managers exercise discretionary accruals to reach earnings forecast targets they voluntarily specify in conjunction with initial public offerings (IPOs). Because the Danish accounting and legal environment is more permissive than the US, we use Denmark as a natural laboratory for learning how business would occur without strict rules, enforcement and sanctions. Danish managers often volunteer pro forma financial statements for results that are expected to occur subsequent to the IPO. We examine a sample of 58 Danish firms that issue voluntary management earnings forecasts in connection with IPOs that occur between 1984 and 1996. The evidence we uncover strongly suggests that pre-managed earnings are adjusted toward these targets. In contrast with Kasznik's (1999 Kasznik, R. (1999). On the association between voluntary disclosure and earnings management. Journal of Accounting Research, 37: pp. 57–81 [Google Scholar]) results related to voluntarily forecasting American firms, managers of Danish firms exercise discretionary accruals to mitigate earnings forecast errors regardless of whether pre-managed earnings are less, or greater, than the IPO forecast amount.     

Anarchy, efficiency, and redistribution

This paper develops a contractarian theory of the state and the existence of redistribution. The existence of rules of redistribution is explained without any recourse to the risk-aversion of agents. No veil of ignorance is needed. This avoids obligational problems inherent in most other contractarian theories of justice. Hence, this paper departs from the standard legitimization of redistribution as fundamental insurance and interprets it as stemming from a principle of reciprocity in trade. Since this paper deals with an anarchic society, the implementation of redistributional rules is constrained by the assumption of self-enforcement. We show that this assumption changes the interpretation of the state: the state is characterized by a particular design of equilibrium strategies, not by the existence of enforcement agencies.