On the Rationality of the Post-Announcement Drift

This paper demonstrates that a post-announcement earnings drift, which is often advanced as an example of market irrationality, can arise even if traders act rationally on their information. Specifically, we show that in the presence of share supply variations which are unrelated to information, there is a positive correlation between the unexpected component of current public signals and future price changes. Such a correlation arises from the fact that while prices reveal private information that cannot be found in public signals, non-information based trading distorts the information content of prices relative to the implications of both private and public information. Under these circumstances, markets may appear semi-strong inefficient and slow to respond to earnings announcements even though information is processed in a timely and efficient manner. Our findings correspond well with previously documented empirical evidence and suggest that the robustness of earnings-based anomalies may be rational outcomes of varying uncertain share supply.     

THE FUNDAMENTAL DETERMINANTS OF TRADING VOLUME REACTION TO FINANCIAL INFORMATION: EVIDENCE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR EMPIRICAL CAPITAL MARKET RESEARCH

Prior empirical research indicates that trading volume reaction to new information increases with the heterogeneity of investors’ prior beliefs. We examine three potential factors that theoretical models of financial economists show determine trading volume reaction to new information: heterogeneous prior beliefs, differential interpretation, and the consensus effect—the extent to which the information causes their beliefs to converge or diverge. We find that these three factors have a distinct and significant incremental effect on trading volume, thereby suggesting that empirical trading volume models that exclude or fail to control for any of these determinants are misspecified with biased estimated coefficients.     

Financial Statements Insurance

The fact that auditors are paid by the companies they audit creates an inherent conflict of interest. We analyze how the provision of financial statements insurance could eliminate this conflict of interest and properly align the incentives of auditors with those of shareholders. We first show that when the benefits to obtaining funding are sufficiently large, the existing legal and regulatory regime governing financial reporting (and auditing) results in low quality financial statements. Consequently, the financial statements of firms are misleading and firms that yield a low rate‐of‐return (low fundamental value) are over‐funded relative to firms characterized by a high rate‐of‐return (high fundamental value). We present a mechanism whereby companies would purchase financial statements insurance that provides coverage to investors against losses suffered as a result of misrepresentation in financial reports. The insurance premia that companies pay for the coverage would be publicized. The insurers appoint and pay the auditors who attest to the accuracy of the financial statements of the prospective insurance clients. For a given level of coverage firms announcing lower premia would distinguish themselves in the eyes of the investors as companies with higher quality financial statements relative to those with higher premia. Every company would be eager to pay lower premia (for a given level of coverage) resulting in a flight to high audit quality. As a result, when financial statements insurance is available and the insurer hires the auditor, capital is provided to the most efficient firms.