An ‘art’, not a ‘science’? Central bank management in Portugal under the gold standard, 1863–871

As long as Portugal was on the gold standard, the Bank of Portugal sought to help stabilize the currency at the exchange rate to which the country was committed. Because it was subject to political and other non-economic constraints, the bank carried out discount rate interventions sparingly, although in accordance with what could be termed the contemporary ‘science’ of central banking. Consequently, it had to intervene frequently in the currency markets, usually in covert fashion, in order to conciliate the needs of convertibility with this less than orthodox stance towards the gold standard. This article also shows how the bank was able to keep on repeatedly infringing the ‘rules of the game’ with success for almost 30 years, and raises the question of the sustainability of such a state of affairs.     

Inattentive Producers

I present and solve the problem of a producer who faces costs of acquiring, absorbing, and processing information. I establish a series of theoretical results describing the producer's behaviour. First, I find the conditions under which the producer prefers to set a plan for the price he or she charges, or instead prefers to set a plan for the quantity he or she sells. Second, I show that the agent rationally chooses to be inattentive to news, only sporadically updating his or her information. I solve for the optimal length of inattentiveness and characterize its determinants. Third, I explicitly aggregate the behaviour of many such producers. I apply these results to a model of inflation. I find that the model can fit the quantitative facts on post-war inflation remarkably well, that it is a good forecaster of future inflation, and that it survives the Lucas critique by fitting also the pre-war facts on inflation moderately well.     

Rank-Order Tournaments and Incentive Alignment: The Effect on Firm Performance

We investigate simultaneously the impact of promotion-based tournament incentives for VPs and equity-based (alignment) incentives for VPs and the chief executive officer (CEO) on firm performance. We find that tournament incentives, as measured by the pay differential between the CEO and VPs, relate positively to firm performance. The relation is more positive when the CEO nears retirement and less positive when the firm has a new CEO, and weakens further when the new CEO is an outsider. Our analysis is robust to corrections for endogeneity of all our incentive measures and to several alternative measures of tournament incentives and firm performance.     

Portuguese living standards, 1720–1980, in European comparison: heights,income, and human capital1

When and why did the Portuguese become the shortest Europeans? In order to find the answer to this question, we trace the trend in Portuguese living standards from the 1720s until recent times. We find that during the early nineteenth century average height in Portugal did not differ significantly from average height in most other European countries, but that when, around 1850, European anthropometric values began to climb sharply, Portugal's did not. In a panel analysis of 12 countries, we find that delay in human‐capital formation was the chief factor hindering any improvement in the biological standard of living in Portugal.