The Association between Trading Recommendations and Broker-Analysts' Earnings Forecasts

This study examines analyst forecast errors within the context of stock recommendations. We predict positive forecast error (i.e., optimism) for buy recommendations and negative forecast error (i.e., pessimism) for sell recommendations. We offer two explanations for this prediction: (1) the unconscious tendency to process information in a manner that supports one's goal, which we refer to as the "objectivity illusion" hypothesis, and (2) the economic incentive to boost trade, which we refer to as the "trade boosting" hypothesis. The pattern of analyst forecast bias we predict (i.e., optimism for buys and pessimism for sells) is opposite in direction to that predicted by the management relations hypothesis—a commonly cited hypothesis for analyst forecast bias.
We find broker-analyst earnings forecast errors are significantly optimistic for buy recommendations and significantly pessimistic for sell recommendations, consistent with the objectivity illusion and trade boosting hypotheses. Our study indicates that the pattern of results reported in prior research (i.e., increasingly optimistic earnings forecasts as the stock recommendation becomes less favorable) is likely driven by a correlated omitted variable, actual earnings. Results of an analysis to distinguish between trade boosting and objectivity illusion appear more consistent with the objectivity illusion.     

Management of Earnings and Analysts' Forecasts to Achieve Zero and Small Positive Earnings Surprises

Abstract:  This paper corroborates the finding of prior studies that managers avoid reporting earnings lower than analyst forecasts (i.e., negative earnings surprises) and provides new evidence of actions contributing to this phenomenon. Specifically, we provide empirical evidence of both (1) upward management of reported earnings and (2) downward 'management' of analysts' forecasts to achieve zero and small positive earnings surprises. Further analysis of the components of earnings management suggests that both the operating cash flow and discretionary accruals components of earnings are managed.     

Analyst revenue forecast reporting and the quality of revenues and expenses

We decompose earnings quality into revenue and expense quality and examine their associations with analyst propensity to supplement their earnings forecasts with revenue forecasts. Analysts report more revenue forecasts to I/B/E/S when expense quality is low to compensate for the low accuracy of their earnings estimates, which has a positive association with expense quality. Expense quality is unassociated with revenue forecast accuracy, thus revenue forecasts become increasingly useful for valuing firms when expense quality is low. Analysts report fewer revenue forecasts when revenue quality is low because both earnings and revenue forecast accuracy decline as revenue quality deteriorates. To control for endogeneity, we use firm‐fixed effects to control for unobserved time‐invariant heterogeneity across firms, instrumental variables regressions and regression in changes.     

Earnings Management to Avoid Losses and Earnings Decreases: Are Analysts Fooled?*

This paper explores whether analyst forecasts impound the earnings management to avoid losses and small earnings decreases documented in Burgstahler and Dichev 1997, whether analysts are able to identify which specific firms engage in such earnings management, and the implications for significant forecast error anomalies at zero earnings and zero forecast earnings. We use data from Zacks Investment Research 1999 and find that analysts anticipate earnings management to avoid small losses and small earnings decreases. Further, analysts are much more likely to forecast zero earnings than firms are to realize zero earnings, and analysts are unable to consistently identify the specific firms that engage in earnings management to avoid small losses. This latter inability contributes to significant forecast pessimism associated with zero reported earnings and significant forecast optimism associated with zero earnings forecasts.     

Negotiating contested visions and place-specific expectations of the hydrogen economy

This paper explores the role of the 'hydrogen economy' as a guiding vision encompassing multiple contested technological futures, value judgements and problem framings. Hydrogen visions draw upon six overarching and competing narrative themes: power and independence; community empowerment and democratisation; ecotopia; hydrogen as technical fix; inevitability and technical progress; and 'staying in the race'. In other words the hydrogen economy possesses great interpretive flexibility. This, it is argued, is the key to hydrogen's rhetorical power, allowing it to become a space in which divergent interests and agendas are promoted. Turning to issues of scale and place, the case of London is used to document the dynamics of expectations: how the open flexible guiding vision of a hydrogen economy must inevitably be re-invented and grounded in local agendas and contexts if its promise is to become realised.