Foreign direct investment and wages in domestic firms in Ireland: Productivity spillovers versus labour‐market crowding out

There is a large literature on the positive spillovers frequently thought to be associated with inward foreign direct investment. Aitken et al. (1996 Aitken, BJ, Harrison, AE and Lipsey, RE. (1996). Wages and foreign ownership: a comparative study of Mexico, Venezuela, and the United States. Journal of International Economics, 40: pp. 345–71 [Google Scholar]) identify several cases, however, where inward FDI appears to have reduced wages in domestic firms. They suggest that this might arise either because foreign firms increase the degree of product‐market competition that domestic firms face, or because they poach the best workers from domestic firms. We concentrate on the second effect, arguing that the first is unlikely to arise in the Irish case to which our data pertain. In a theoretical section we show that the labour‐market poaching effect cannot generate the results postulated if labour markets are competitive and production functions are of the Cobb–Douglas variety, but that it can arise if production functions display higher elasticities of substitution. In an empirical section based on a sample of larger Irish firms we show that, consistent with our theoretical model, foreign presence has different effects on wages and productivity in domestic exporting and non‐exporting establishments.     

The New Game in Town: Competitive Effects of IPOs

We analyze the effect of initial public offerings (IPOs) on industry competitors and provide evidence that companies experience negative stock price reactions to completed IPOs in their industry and positive stock price reactions to their withdrawal. Following a successful IPO in their industry, they show significant deterioration in their operating performance. These results are consistent with the existence of IPO‐related competitive advantages through the loosening of financial constraints, financial intermediary certification, and the presence of knowledge capital. These aspects of competitiveness are significant in explaining the cross‐section of underperformance as well as survival probabilities for competing firms.     

Making strategic judgements

Can a case to be made for managers to become less risk-averse or even act in a manner contrary to conventional wisdom? Jules Goddard and Tony Eccles suggest that may be the best strategy during economic turmoil.     

Sticky Information Phillips Curves: European Evidence

We estimate the Sticky Information Phillips Curve model of Mankiw and Reis (2002) using survey expectations of professional forecasters from four major European economies. Our estimates imply that inflation expectations in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom are updated about once a year, while in Italy, about once each 6 months.     

International evidence on the tax- and revenue-smoothing hypotheses

This paper tests Barro's tax-smoothing hypothesis and Mankiw'srevenue-smoothing hypothesis, using quarterly data for fourcountries - Canada, France, the UK, and the US. The tests areconducted using recent advances in the theory of integratedregressors, the single-equation approach (with the time seriesproperties of the data imposed in estimation and hypothesistesting) as well as the multi-equation VAR approach, which treatsall variables as part of a joint process. There is considerableevidence for tax-smoothing (and inflation-smoothing) but nonefor revenue-smoothing.     

Performance Measure Congruity and the Balanced Scorecard

This paper studies the incentive effects of a balanced scorecard within a multitask agency framework under both formal and relational contracts. First, the main characteristics of the balanced scorecard are analyzed with respect to performance measure congruity. It is shown that under complete verifiability, a properly designed balanced scorecard is capable of perfectly aligning the interests of owners and employees by means of an explicit contract. I then investigate whether subjective performance evaluation is beneficial when not all the scorecard measures are contractible. It emerges that congruity of the contractible scorecard measures constrains a purely implicit incentive contract, but the first‐best solution may still be obtained through a combination of formal and relational contracts. Furthermore, a purely explicit contract in most cases can be improved by incorporating subjective rewards.     

哈佛商学院 减少财务报表中的估值失误

财务报表中一些科目的数字,越来越依赖于个人的主观判断,审查数字的准确性原本是会计师和审计师的职责,但受制于能力,他们很难起到实质性作用。也就是说,董事和高管们不得不面对一种风险——公司的财务报表很可能是不准确的,甚至具有误导性。这意味着一系列潜在后果,比如股东抱怨、股价骤然下挫、高管被解雇等。