SOCIAL SECURITY AND THE POOR: Choices for Developing Countries

There is an urgent need to provide an effective safety net forthe poorest in societies ranging from socialist countries undergoingreform to Sub-Saharan African economies. This article examinessocial security systems in industrial countries and explorestheir relevance to developing countries. The objective of socialsecurity is defined broadly as public action, including thatby communities, to protect the poor and vulnerable from adversechanges in living standards. Relevant instruments include employmentand income guarantees, and also such formal policy instrumentsas assistance, social insurance, and family allowances. Thearticle highlights issues that arise in providing social securityin developing countries, particularly its effectiveness in protectingthe target groups.      

Inequality and Poverty in China: Institutional Change and Public Policy, 1978 to 1988

There is considerable uncertainty and debate about changes inpoverty and living standards that are likely to occur in aneconomy in transition from centrally planned allocations toa more market-oriented basis, but a dearth of evidence and rigorousanalysis remains. There is a tradeoff between policies thatprovide a guaranteed living standard with low inequality, albeitat a low income level, and systems that provide much highermonetary incomes, but create greater income variability andvulnerability, particularly during periods of high inflation.The Chinese experience following the economic reforms of 1978highlights this dilemma, and our analysis strongly suggeststhe need for appropriate social safety nets if rapid growthis to be achieved without the poor and vulnerable bearing thecosts of such growth.     

The theory of reform and indian indirect taxes

Given a set of value judgements, an initial state, and a model of the economy, one can ask whether some feasible tax change would increase welfare. We do this by defining the marginal cost in terms of welfare of raising an extra rupee from the ith good. The inverse optimum problem is the calculation of non-negative welfare weights on households which imply that the initial state is optimum. If no such welfare weights exist, then a Pareto improvement is possible. We illustrate the concepts and results using data from the Indian economy for 1979–1980. Directions of tax reform for a number of specific social welfare functions and for Pareto improvements are presented.