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1.
2.
Al Gini 《Journal of Business Ethics》1997,16(3):323-330
This paper develops and examines the distinctions between the process of leadership, the person of the leader, and the job of leading. I argue that leadership is a delicate combination of the process, the techniques of leadership, the person, the specific talents and traits of a/the leader, and the general requirements of the job itself. The concept of leadership can and must be distinguishable and definable separately from our understanding of what and who leaders are, although the phenomenon of leadership can only be known and measured in the particular instantiation of a leader doing a job. 相似文献
3.
4.
The liquidity effect, defined as a decrease in nominal interest rates in response to a monetary expansion, is a major stylized fact of the business cycle. This paper first confirms that, with separable preferences, a low degree of intertemporal substitution in consumption is a necessary condition for the existence of the liquidity effect. In contrast to this result, in a model with non-separable preferences and capital accumulation it takes an implausibly high elasticity of intertemporal substitution to produce a liquidity effect. The robustness of these results to alternative degrees of nominal rigidities, capital adjustment costs and stochastic monetary processes is also analysed. We conclude that price stickiness, by itself, does not guarantee the existence of a liquidity effect. 相似文献
5.
This paper studies the dispersion around the expected compensation of workers before and after controlling for hierarchical positions in cross-section data samples. From data for Spanish managers, we find that this dispersion decreases with education and work experience before entering the current job and increases with job tenure. This finding contrasts with previous research that finds a positive association between compensation dispersion and education and work experience. We explain the new finding through a model of learning that separates compensation dispersion between jobs and within jobs (hierarchical positions). The model takes advantage of the information revealed when workers are promoted to their current hierarchical positions and allows for more robust tests of learning theories. 相似文献
6.
Miklós Losoncz 《Intereconomics》2003,38(3):132-137
In mid-January 2003 a severe speculative attack was launched against the exchange rate of the Hungarian forint. The attack
was very unusual in the history of foreign exchange speculations, since it was aimed at enforcing the appreciation — and not
the depreciation — of the currency targeted. The specific nature of this kind of speculation is closely related to Hungary’s
accession to the European Union in general and to EMU in particular. Since the other Central and Eastern European acceding
countries face similar problems and challenges, the Hungarian experience may involve some instructive lessons on monetary
and economic policy for them too. 相似文献
7.
We construct a model in which the ambiguity of candidates allows them to increase the number of voters to whom they appeal.
We focus our analysis on two points that are central to obtain ambiguity in equilibrium: restrictions on the beliefs that
candidates can induce in voters, and intensity of voters' preferences. The first is necessary for a pure strategy equilibrium
to exist, while the second is necessary for ambiguity in equilibrium when there exists a Condorcet winner in the set of pure
alternatives (e.g. the spatial model of electoral competition), and when candidates' only objective is to win the election.
In this last case, an ambiguous candidate may offer voters with different preferences the hope that their most preferred alternative
will be implemented. We also show that if there are sufficiently many candidates or parties, ambiguity will not be possible
in equilibrium, but a larger set of possible policies increases the chance that at least one candidate will choose to be ambiguous
in equilibrium.
We would like to thank Alberto Alesina, Antonio Cabrales, Steve Coate, Olivier Compte, Tim Feddersen, Itzhak Gilboa, Joe Harrington,
Michel Le Breton, Alessandro Lizzeri, George Mailath, Steve Matthews, Steve Morris, Ignacio Ortuno, Tom Palfrey, Larry Samuelson,
Murat Sertel, Fernando Vega, Eyal Winter and an anonymous referee for helpful comments. The first author acknowledges financial
support from DGICYT-PB 95-0983. This work was done while the first author was visiting the Center in Political Economy at
Washington University, and visiting the Center for Basic Research in the Social Sciences at Harvard University. Their hospitality
is gratefully acknowledged. The support of the second author's research by the National Science Foundation is also gratefully
acknowledged. 相似文献
8.
Welfare reducing licensing 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
In this paper, we characterize situations where licensing a cost reducing innovation to a rival firm using two-part tariff contracts (a fixed fee plus a linear per unit of output royalty) reduces social welfare. We show that it occurs if (i) the firms compete in prices, (ii) the innovation is large enough but not drastic, and (iii) the goods are close enough substitutes. Moreover, we show that, regardless of the type of competition, first, the optimal contract always includes a positive royalty and, second, even drastic innovations are licensed whenever the goods are not homogeneous. 相似文献
9.
AbstractThis paper contributes to the empirical research around the “wage-led” or “profit-led” demand regimes. It first reviews how Kalecki, and then Steindl, approached the relationship between economic growth and income distribution. Then, empirical analysis carried out under the probabilistic approach to econometric modeling shows statistical evidence, estimated through cointegration analysis, that in the long run, in three very open economies—Mexico, France, and Korea—the wage share is positively associated with demand and output. It finally discusses the macroeconomic dilemma that almost all countries have to face, i.e., a positive effect of a high-wage policy on demand and employment may diverge from a negative effect on output compatible with external equilibrium. 相似文献
10.
This paper develops a contractarian theory of the state and the existence of redistribution. The existence of rules of redistribution is explained without any recourse to the risk-aversion of agents. No veil of ignorance is needed. This avoids obligational problems inherent in most other contractarian theories of justice. Hence, this paper departs from the standard legitimization of redistribution as fundamental insurance and interprets it as stemming from a principle of reciprocity in trade. Since this paper deals with an anarchic society, the implementation of redistributional rules is constrained by the assumption of self-enforcement. We show that this assumption changes the interpretation of the state: the state is characterized by a particular design of equilibrium strategies, not by the existence of enforcement agencies. 相似文献