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We characterize the equilibrium of the all-pay auction with general convex cost of effort and sequential effort choices. We
consider a set of n players who are arbitrarily partitioned into a group of players who choose their efforts ‘early’ and a group of players who
choose ‘late’. Only the player with the lowest cost of effort has a positive payoff in any equilibrium. This payoff depends
on his own timing vis-a-vis the timing of others. We also show that the choice of timing can be endogenized, in which case
the strongest player typically chooses ‘late’, whereas all other players are indifferent with respect to their choice of timing.
In the most prominent equilibrium the player with the lowest cost of effort wins the auction at zero aggregate cost.
We thank Dan Kovenock and Luis C. Corchón for discussion and helpful comments. The usual caveat applies. Wolfgang Leininger
likes to express his gratitude to Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB) for its generous hospitality and financial support. 相似文献
4.
Kai A. Konrad 《European Economic Review》2002,46(8):1521-1537
In many situations the individuals who can generate some output must enter a contest for appropriating this output. This paper analyses the investment incentives of such agents and the role of incumbency advantages in the contest. Depending on the advantages, an increase in the productivity of the investment can decrease or increase the amount of investment. The results are applied to autocrats’ investment behavior and job specific investment in organizations. 相似文献
5.
Konrad Podczeck 《Economic Theory》1992,2(2):247-263
Summary In this paper the existence of a general equilibrium with differentiated commodities is proved for the classical case of a production set with constant returns, spanned by elementary activities without joint production, and with a finite set of primary factors. This framework allows to proceed without strong assumptions concerning substitution possibilities, which are typical in general equilibrium theory with differentiated commodities, but which at least with respect to production are not adequate to the problem. Moreover, in our model general consumption sets are allowed. Thus true intermediate products are not excluded. Furthermore the possibility of survival without trade is not assumed.I am indebted to E. Dierker, M. Hellwig, K.J. Koch, A. Mas-Colell, M. Nermuth, W. Neudeck, and to an anonymous referee for comments and suggestions. Of course, I am responsible for any shortcomings. Finally, support by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft through SFB 303 is gratefully acknowledged. 相似文献
6.
Reductions of environmentally harmful emissions are often a public good in a global context. For strategic reasons, countries may adopt a technology with high per unit cost of emission reduction, even if a technology with lower per unit cost is available at no extra cost. They thereby credibly commit themselves to not reducing emission much in the future. In a game of private voluntary provision of emission reduction, this commitment will make other countries increase their emission reductions. Also, in the case where countries cooperate in the future, such commitment gives a country a strategic advantage, because it shifts the disagreement point in a favorable direction. 相似文献
7.
What accounts for the diversity and limited concentration that has long characterized the organization of the advertising agency industry? This question is addressed by treating an advertising agency as a multiproduct firm. The firm's product line or service mix is defined in terms of the set of different media categories where an agency places the advertising messages that it creates on behalf of its clients. Evidence is presented indicating that the structure of demand and costs in the advertising agency industry conforms to the conditions that MacDonald and Slivinski showed were required for an industry to sustain an equilibrium with diversified firms. Building on this framework, we formulate a set of three hypotheses relating to the realization of product-specific scale and scope economies. The first two hypotheses posit that given low fixed costs and minimal entry barriers, both media-specific scale and scope economies are available and can be exploited by relatively small-size agencies. The third hypothesis suggests that large agencies may experience diseconomies of scope as a consequence of excessive diversification induced by two pervasive industry institutional phenomena: (1) “bundling” of agency services to match client demand for a mix of media advertising, and (2) “conflict policy,” which prohibits an agency from serving competing accounts and operates as a mobility constraint. Utilizing a multiproduct cost function, we estimate media-specific scale and scope economies for a cross section of 401 U.S. agencies in 1987. The results obtained support the set of three hypotheses outlined above. The paper concludes with a discussion of the implications of these findings for the restructuring currently underway in this industry. 相似文献
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Ass. Dr. Kai A. Konrad 《Journal of Economics》1993,57(1):95-101
This paper extends results on the consistency of two-moment decision models with expected utility to rank-dependent utility preferences. The representations of expected utility and rank-dependent utility by --preferences have very similar comparative statics properties for linear distribution classes, except for the behavior with respect to small independent risks.I thank Soo Hong Chew for helpful discussion and three anonymous referees for valuable comments. 相似文献
10.
Armin Richard Konrad 《Journal of Business Ethics》1982,1(3):195-200
Moral Sanctuary is used in this paper as a metaphor for any theory which makes actions immune from moral criticism. Three arguments favoring moral sanctuaries for business activities are countered. Two of the arguments rest on faulty analogies. One compares business activities to games, another to the behavior of machines. The third rests on the claim that business is a unique activity. This position is rejected by a reductio ad absurdum argument; it entails the immunity of all professional activities from moral judgment. I argue that business managers are accountable to the combined requirements of professionalism and democratic citizenship, notions which are briefly described at the conclusion of the paper. 相似文献