A Common Pool Resource Game with Sequential Decisions and Experimental Evidence

We describe a common pool resource game in which players choose how much of the stock to extract in a sequential manner. There are two choices and one represents taking a larger proportion of the stock than the other. After a player makes a choice, the remaining stock grows at a constant rate. We consider a game with a finite number of alternating moves. It is shown that changes in the larger proportion of the stock that the players are allowed to take and the growth rate affect equilibrium, but have little effect on behavior in the laboratory. In addition to observing more cooperation than predicted, we observe that parameters that are strategically irrelevant affect behavior. The results of this research might help policy makers in developing adequate policies to prevent overexploitation of some natural renewable resources.     

Behavior in one-shot traveler’s dilemma games: model and experiments with advice

We report results of one-shot traveler’s dilemma game experiments to test the predictions of a model of introspection. The model describes a noisy out-of-equilibrium process by which players reach a decision of what to do in one-shot games. To test the robustness of the model and to compare it to other models of introspection without noise, we introduce non-binding advice. Advice has the effect of coordinating all players’ beliefs onto a common strategy. Experimentally, advice is implemented by asking subjects who participated in a repeated traveler’s dilemma game to recommend an action to subjects playing one-shot games with identical parameters. In contrast to observations, models based on best-response dynamics would predict lower claims than the advised. We show that our model’s predictions with and without advice are consistent with the data.      

Balancing the risk of ‘Lazearian’ interrupters and the benefits of educational and social peers: tracing parental preferences for class-size reduction

Using Danish survey data from a choice experiment, parental preferences for class-size reduction are estimated. While parents with children in large classes are willing to pay for class-size reduction, parents with children in small classes are reluctant and even express negative utility for further class-size reduction. We interpret this as parents balancing the risk of ‘Lazearian’ interrupters and the benefits of educational and social peers when forming their preferences for class size.     

VRP revisited: The impact of behavioural costs in balancing standardisation and variety

The objective of this paper is to bring a new element to the academic (and industrial) debate concerning the optimum level of variety in component design in mass production companies. Many authors have explored the trade-off between functional and variety costs, and this could be considered as a well-acknowledged management issue, at least from an engineering perspective. Nevertheless, while defining the theoretically optimal level of component variety, there are other elements, more related to operators’ attitude or to operative conditions, which may intervene and prevent effective exploitation of the existing variety. These elements have been given scant attention in literature, while they may play a relevant role in real organisations.In this paper, we will present a case study and an analytic model for these “behavioural costs” in manufacturing environments, so as to show how the theoretically optimal amount of variety changes if one takes into account these aspects. Researchers (and practitioners) might leverage on this contribution in order to rejuvenate the Variety Reduction paradigm, and to increase their awareness in designing and managing mass production manufacturing processes.     

Criteria of systems thinking

In science, the framework of systems theory—especially as developed over the past two decades—seems to be the ideal framework to express the emerging ecological paradigm. This article addresses the question: what is systems thinking—and more generally, holistic or ecological thinking—in modern science? The author identifies three key aspects of systems thinking that are characteristic in all the sciences. In presenting these aspects, the transition from the old to the new paradigm for each aspect is emphasized.     

Revolutionary change in our worldview?

Fritjof Capra has become internationally known through two pioneering books, both best sellers, titled The Tao of Physics and The Turning Point. His third book, Green Politics which he wrote with Charlene Spretnak, was published in May 1984. The central theme which runs through all his work is the paradigmatic change in the Western view of the world. This article is taken from several conversations which Bart van Steenbergen had with Fritjof Capra. It begins with some background information and then looks at Fritjof Capra's work over the past 15 years.     

Classroom Games: A Prisoner's Dilemma

This survey of intermediate microeconomic textbooks will be helpful to those in the throes of selecting a suitable text. The author identifies the major review criteria and examines nine widely used books, grouping them by type of approach.     

Are (active) entrepreneurs a different breed?

We present data from an incentivized online experiment and responses from a set of validated psychological questionnaires to measure entrepreneurs' risk and time preferences and to identify entrepreneurs' personality characteristics. The analyses of the data suggest that intrinsic motivation positively relates to the likelihood of owning a business (i.e., being an active entrepreneur). We also found that subjects who scored higher on drive were relatively more risk seeking while those who scored higher on pessimism were more patient. The results of our study highlight the importance of studying personality traits to better understand what drives people to own a business.     

Coordination

Many economic games have multiple equilibria, some of which are better than others for everyone involved. Such coordination games are of special interest to economists because they raise the possibility that a group of individuals or even a whole economy might become mired in an unfavorable situation. This paper explains how to use playing cards in the classroom to implement an economic game with multiple, Pareto-ranked equilibria. Discussion can focus on policies and institutions that promote coordination on better outcomes. Use: This experiment can be used in introductory economics to teach concepts of team production and coordination and in intermediate microeconomics to teach game-theoretic concepts of Nash equilibrium and Pareto optimality. Time required: Five minutes for reading instructions, 20 minutes for decision making, and about 15 minutes for discussion. Materials: You will need one or more decks of playing cards, each deck accommodating 26 people. One copy of the instructions should be made for each person. Payment to a randomly selected individual is optional and will require about a dollar or two.     

Learning and Noisy Equilibrium Behavior in an Experimental Study of Imperfect Price Competition*

We consider a duopoly pricing game with a unique Bertrand–Nashequilibrium. The high‐price firm has a nonvanishing market share, however, and intuition suggests that observed prices may be positively related to this market share. This relationship is implied by a model in which players make noisy (logit) best responses to expected payoff differences. The resulting logit equilibrium model was used to design an experiment in which the high‐price firm's market share varies. The model accurately predicts the final‐period price averages. A naive learning model predicts the observed differences in the time paths of average prices.