Investor behaviour in a nascent capital market: Scottish bank shareholders in the nineteenth century

This article uses the records of nineteenth‐century Scottish banks in an attempt to understand investor behaviour in the early British capital market. It presents four main findings, some of which do not conform to the basic assumptions of standard asset pricing theories. First, in an era when efficient portfolio diversification was not possible, the intrinsic risk of an equity security was an important input into investor decision‐making. Second, our evidence suggests that businesspeople initially regarded bank stock as a consumption good, as being a stockholder gave them privileged access to bank finance. When bank lending practices changed in the middle of the century, this access‐to‐credit advantage associated with owning bank stock largely disappeared. Third, investors typically exhibited a bias towards banks that conducted business in the areas where they resided. Fourth, a sizeable proportion of investors were stockholders in more than one bank.     

Related Party Transactions: A Preliminary Evaluation of SFAS 57 and IAS 24 Using Four Case Studies

Transactions between related parties have been the subject of increasing concern in recent years. Corporate scandals, overseas and local, have typically involved non-arm's length transactions contrived between the reporting entity and related companies or affiliates. These scandals provided catalysts for the relatively recent development of accounting standards on related party transactions.
This paper considers whether the application of the new pronouncements, particularly the Financial Accounting Standards Boards' statement 57 and its international equivalent, International Accounting Standard 24, is likely to overcome the problems highlighted in several major scandals. The methodology adopted involves the hypothetical application of the two pronouncements to the pertinent facts in four case studies: (1) Continental Vending, a U.S. criminal court case; (2) Penn Central, a U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission investigation case; (3) Tarling (Haw Par), a Singapore criminal court case; and (4) Stanhill, an Australian case investigated by a government appointed Inspector.
In each hypothetical application, the resultant presentation is compared with the stated expectations found in the relevant findings of the case. In all cases, SFAS 57 and IAS 24 are found to be deficient.
While four case studies may not be sufficient for drawing general conclusions about either SFAS 57 or IAS 24 the conclusions of this study represent preliminary evidence for evaluating those standards.     

The character and denomination of shares in the Victorian equity market1

The seminal work of J. B. Jefferys highlighted two unusual features of the Victorian equity market, namely high share denomination and uncalled capital. This article examines the extent to which publicly traded company stocks in the nineteenth century had these features. It also analyses the effect of these features on stock returns using monthly data for the London Stock Market over the period 1825–70. We find that stocks with unpaid capital earned a higher return, which is consistent with investors being rewarded for the risk of a call on their personal assets. We also find that stocks with a high share denomination earned a lower return, which is consistent with the view that this feature was conducive to superior corporate governance.     

Incentives for Non‐Disclosure by Corporate Groups

A regulatory approved deed of cross guarantee (the deed) was introduced into Australia in December 1991, relieving participating companies within a group from having to prepare, have audited, and file financial statements. We examine the characteristics of firms that obtain relief from filing (and therefore disclosing) separate financial statements of closed‐group companies by adopting the deed. This is the first attempt to analyse adoption using large‐scale archival data. The results support the survey evidence in Dean and Clarke (2005 ), thus providing triangulation on their work. In particular they support the view that the decision to adopt the deed is a function of strategic factors as well as accounting and auditing cost savings. Those strategic factors were not in focus when regulators first introduced a deed of indemnity in 1985, nor when the original indemnity was modified to become a deed of cross guarantee in 1991 or when it was further modified in 1998. Further, evidence is provided to test the conflicting ideas arising from the analytical literature and the mixed results in the empirical, voluntary disclosure literatures. That evidence suggests that non‐disclosure arises when firms are in a more competitive industry and, in particular, when there is ability to retain non‐disclosure at the consolidated level (i.e., where the number of segments is high). Other factors supporting non‐disclosure are leverage and the proportion of foreign operations (proxying for deed complexity). The proportion of outside directors (a proxy for legal liability) and the number of shares outstanding (a proxy for agency costs of equity) are not associated with the decision to adopt the deed.