An Experimental Study of Bond Market Pricing

An important feature of bond markets is the relationship between the initial public offering (IPO) price and the probability that the issuer defaults. On the one hand, the default probability affects the IPO price; on the other hand, the IPO price affects the default probability. It is a priori unclear whether agents can competitively price such assets. Our paper is the first to explore this question. To do so, we use laboratory experiments. We develop two flexible bond market models that are easily implemented in the laboratory. We find that subjects learn to price the bonds well after only a few repetitions.     

Utility Averaging Policies—Impact on Consumer's Energy Usage

Average Monthly Payment (AMP) plan is a utility policy designed to assist consumers in need such as low income and elderly. This study examines whether this utility policy is an advantage to these target customers. Results indicate that, with a muted price signal, the AMP plan produces an effect contrary to the objective of assisting low and fixed income consumers. Further, the study indicates consumers on the AMP plan consume more energy and the AMP plan does not appear to support energy conservation and efficiency.     

Government Purchases, Government Transfers, and the Post-1970 Slowdown In U.S. Economic Growth

This article shows that the post-1970 slowdown in U.S. economic growth can be explained by a shift in fiscal policy away from government purchases and toward transfer payments. Two endogenous growth models that include government purchases and transfers imply a relationship between these variables and long-run growth. Empirically, the simultaneous decline in the fraction of output purchased by federal, state, and local governments and rise in transfer payments around 1970 dramatically overpredict the growth slowdown of the early 1970s. The growth rate is predicted to have risen in the absence of this change in fiscal policy.     

The Influence of Elections on the Accounting Choices of Governmental Entities

This paper investigates whether gubernatorial elections affect state governments’ accounting choices. We identify two accounts, the compensated absence liability account and the unfunded pension liability account, which provide incumbent gubernatorial candidates with flexibility for manipulation. We find that, in an election year, the liability associated with compensated absences and unfunded pension liabilities are both systematically lower. We also find that the variation in these employment‐related liabilities is correlated with proxies for the incumbent's incentives and ability to manipulate their accounting reports. Jointly, these results suggest that state governments manipulate accounting numbers to present a healthier financial picture in an election year.     

Do Rating Agencies Benefit from Providing Higher Ratings? Evidence from the Consequences of Municipal Bond Ratings Recalibration

We ask whether credit rating agencies receive higher fees and gain greater market share when they provide more favorable ratings. To investigate this question, we use the 2010 rating scale recalibration by Moody's and Fitch, which increased ratings absent any underlying change in issuer credit quality. Consistent with prior research, we find that the recalibration allowed the clients of Moody's and Fitch to receive better ratings and lower yields. We add to this evidence by showing that the recalibration also led to larger fees and to increases in the market shares of Moody's and Fitch. These results are consistent with critics’ concerns about the effects of the issuer‐pay model on the credit ratings market.     

Time Aggregation and the Relationship between Inflation and Money Growth

Using panel data for 99 countries, we confirm that the measured elasticity of prices with respect to money is higher, and closer to unity, the higher is money growth and the longer the time horizon over which the data are averaged. We propose two explanations. In one, the true model of inflation involves a lagged response to money growth. In the other, there is negative correlation between shocks to inflation and money growth. Our empirical results can be explained if high–money‐growth countries have (i) shorter lags or (ii) less negative correlation, when compared to countries with low money growth.     

Do Strict Regulators Increase the Transparency of Banks?

We investigate the role that regulatory strictness plays on the enforcement of financial reporting transparency in the U.S. banking industry. Using a novel measure of regulatory strictness in the enforcement of capital adequacy, we show that strict regulators are more likely to enforce restatements of banks' call reports. Further, we find that the effect of regulatory strictness on accounting enforcement is strongest in periods leading up to economic downturns and for banks with riskier asset portfolios. Overall, the results from our study indicate that regulatory oversight plays an important role in enforcing financial reporting transparency, particularly in periods leading up to economic crises. We interpret this evidence as inconsistent with the idea that strict bank regulators put significant weight on concerns about the potential destabilizing effects of accounting transparency.     

Analyzing U.S. Output and the Great Moderation by Simultaneous Unobserved Components

This paper seeks to determine the causal interaction between structural trend and cycle innovations in an unobserved components framework of aggregate output. For the purpose of identification, I propose allowing for shifts in volatility. This strategy provides good estimation precision when applied to U.S. industrial production. In the early 1980s, predominance of cycle shocks gives way to strong negative spillovers of trend impulses, consistent with real business cycle theories. The coincident reduction of macroeconomic volatility was mainly caused by pronounced dampening of transitory disturbances. This is in accordance with an important role of macroeconomic policy in explaining the Great Moderation.     

Direct Evidence on the Informational Properties of Earnings in Loan Contracts

Using a sample of firms that disclose the realizations of earnings used for determining covenant compliance in loan contracts, we provide direct evidence on the informational properties of earnings used in the performance covenants included in debt contracts. We find that the earnings measure used in performance covenants does not exhibit asymmetric loss timeliness and has significantly greater cash flow predictive ability than GAAP measures of earnings. We suggest that these results reflect the idea that contracting parties design accounting rules for performance covenants to enhance their efficacy as “tripwires.”