应用型本科高校市场营销学课程线上教学质量评价体系构建

以市场营销学课程为例,探索构建应用型本科高校线上教学的质量评价体系,有助于推动线上教学高效提质发展。通过综合15位市场营销教学领域专家教授的评价意见,结合市场营销学课程线上教学基本要求,运用层次分析法,设计出市场营销学线上教学质量评价指标体系。该评价体系兼顾师资队伍、教学理念、教学方法、教学目标、教学过程、教学资源、教学活动、教学评价与反馈等标准,对应用型本科高校线上教学活动的开展和质量把控提供一定的借鉴价值。     

市域(郊)铁路车辆选型方案探讨

随着城镇化进程的加快和城市经济辐射能力的增强,以特大城市中心城为核心的都市圈逐渐形成,都市圈内的经济联系更加紧密,都市圈核心区与外围的出行需求迅速增长,市域(郊)铁路的概念被引进,选择符合市域(郊)铁路特点的车辆类型是设计的重点。     

Measurement distortion and missing contingencies in optimal contracts

Summary Theory suggests that optimal contracts should include many contingencies to achieve optimal risk sharing. However, in practice, few contracts are as complex as theory suggests. This paper develops a model which is consistent with this observation. The lack of risk sharing results from the interplay of two factors. First, contingencies must be based on information produced by measurement systems, which may be manipulable. Second, when two parties to a contract meet, they often have incomplete information. The type of contract offered may reveal information about the party who proposes it. Different types of agents have different preferences over contingent contracts, because they have different abilities to manipulate the measurement system. These differences in preferences allow the parties to signal their types through the contracts they offer. Noncontingent contracts may be chosen in equilibrium because they are the only contracts which do not give any type an incentive to distort the measurement system and, hence, do not reveal information about the party proposing the contract.We have benefited from conversations with Oliver Hart, Rick Lambert, Michael Riordan and Jean Tirole and the comments of Michel Habib, Nick Yannelis and two anonymous referees. Financial support from the National Science Foundation under grants SES-8920048 and SES-8720589 is gratefully acknowledged.     

网络环境下企业内部控制探讨

网络技术和经济促进了企业控制环境的变革、会计系统体系结构重组及企业内部控制程序的完善 ,同时也增加了安全控制的难度。相应的网络安全策略     

体育营销在注意力经济中的创新

在阐释注意力经济的基本理论的基础上,探索了该理论在体育营销中的应用,并对体育营销的策略提出了建议.     

试论循环经济价值链及其运行

企业必须按照自然生态体系，将经济活动高效有序地组织成一个循环经济模式，实现以最小的资源消耗，最小的污染获取最大的发展效益。循环经济的正常运行，必须有价值链的支持，因此，循环型产业的价值形成机制是循环经济持续发展的关键。企业是实施循环经济的最终策动力和执行主体。因此，循环经济特别是循环经济价值链能否形成已成为企业持续发展的重要因素。     

科技金融促进徐州科技型中小企业高质量发展研究

徐州市大力推动科技与金融深度结合,以科技金融助推实体经济和科技型企业高质量发展.通过对徐州科技金融发展现状、问题的分析研究,提出徐州科技与金融结合实现新发展模式和路径,为职能部门制定政策、支持科技与金融结合发展提供理论依据和参考借鉴.     

Expected revenue of all-pay auctions and first-price sealed-bid auctions with budget constraints

We show that all-pay auctions dominate first-price sealed-bid auctions when bidders face budget constraints. This ranking is explained by the fact that budget constraints bind less frequently in the all-pay auctions, which leads to more aggressive bidding in that format.     

土地经营适度规模的初步研究

土地经营的适度规模是与一定的自然，经济、社会、技术条件相适应的，它的大小受资源禀赋，经营环境（经济发展水平，农业社会服务体系完善程度，风险和不确定性因素。政策性配套措施，其他社会经济条件）、生产力水平，劳动者素质等多种因素的影响，本文从分析土地经营适度规范的影响因素和我国推行适度规模经营的条件入手，对全国30个省级行政单位进行了分区，指明了各区的发展方向，并测算了现阶段我国土地经营的适度规模，最后给出了各地计算适度规模的方法。     

Equilibria and Pareto optima of markets with adverse selection

Summary This paper examines the efficiency properties of competitive equilibrium in an economy with adverse selection. The agents (firms and households) in this economy exchange contracts, which specify all the relevant aspects of their interaction. Markets are assumed to be complete, in the sense that all possible contracts can, in principle, be traded. Since prices are specified as part of the contract, they cannot be used as free parameters to equate supply and demand in the market for the contract. Instead, equilibrium is achieved by adjusting the probability of trade. If the contract space is sufficiently rich, it can be shown that rationing will not be observed in equilibrium. A further refinement of equilibrium is proposed, restricting agents' beliefs about contracts that are not traded in equilibrium. Incentive-efficient and constrained incentive-efficient allocations are defined to be solutions to appropriately specified mechanism design problems. Constrained incentive efficiency is an artificial construction, obtained by adding the constraint that all contracts yield the same rate of return to firms. Using this notion, analogues of the fundamental theorems of welfare economics can be proved: all refined equilibria are constrained incentive-efficient and all constrained incentive-efficient allocations satisfying some additional conditions can be decentralized as refined equilibria. A constrained incentive-efficient equilibrium is typically not incentive-efficient, however. The source of the inefficiency is the equilibrium condition that forces all firms to earn the same rate of return on each contract.Notation ={ ₁,..., _k } set of outcomes - : ₊ generic contract or lottery - A = () ; - A_o A{, where denotes the null contract or no trade - S={1,...,¦S¦} set of seller types - L(s) number of type-s sellers - M number of buyers - u: × S seller's utility function, which can be extended toA× S by puttingu(, s) ; - v. × S buyer's utility function, which can be extended toA × S by puttingv(, s) ; - f:A ₀ ×S ₊ allocation of sellers - g:A ₀ ×S ₊ allocation of buyers - A ₊ sellers' trading function - :A ×S ₊ buyers' trading function This paper has had a long gestation period, during which I have been influenced by helpful conversations with many persons, by their work, or both. Among those who deserve special mention are Martin Hellwig, Roger Myerson, Edward Prescott, Robert Townsend and Yves Younés. Earlier versions were presented to the NBER/CEME Conference on Decentralization at the University of Toronto and the NBER Conference on General Equilibrium at Brown University. I would like to thank John Geanakoplos, Walter Heller, Andreu Mas Colell, Michael Peters, Michel Poitevin, Lloyd Shapley, John Wooders, Nicholas Yannelis and an anonymous referee for their helpful comments and especially Robert Rosenthal for his careful reading of two drafts. The financial support of the National Science Foundation under Grant No. 912202 is gratefully acknowledged.