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This article presents a model of political corruption in which a briber can choose either to bribe only the incumbent party or to capture also the opposition party to sterilize its monitoring role. The analysis also explores interparty collusion, media independence, and political contestability. The model suggests that policies aiming to strengthen the role of minorities can produce ambiguous effects as they may induce bribers' avoidance behavior. Reputational sanctions appear to be less effective than criminal ones, although political contestability increases their deterrence effect. Paradoxically, harsh criminal sanctions may induce tacit collusion because minorities highly regard their outcomes once in power. 相似文献
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Bragoli Daniela Cortelezzi Flavia Giannoccolo Pierpaolo Marseguerra Giovanni 《Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting》2020,54(3):779-801
Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - This paper investigates the interaction between R&D investment timing, probability of default, and capital structure. In particular we are... 相似文献
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