Commitment and choice of partner in a negotiation with a deadline

This paper analyses the effects of partially revocable endogenous commitments of a seller in a negotiation with a deadline. In particular, we examine when commitment is a source of strength, a source of inefficiency and when it does not affect the bargaining outcome at all. We show that when commitment possesses a minimum amount of irrevocability this crucially determines the bargaining outcome. In the bilateral bargaining case, commitment becomes a source of inefficiency since it causes a deadline effect. In the choice of partner framework, however, the deadline effect disappears and there is an immediate agreement and, moreover, commitment becomes a source of strength since it increases the seller's equilibrium payoff by triggering off competition between the buyers.     

Self-enforcing international environmental agreements with a stock pollutant

In this paper the stability of an International Environmental Agreement (IEA) among N identical countries that emit a pollutant are studied using a two-stage game. In the first stage each country decides noncooperatively whether or not to join an IEA, and in the second stage signatories jointly against nonsignatories determine their emissions in a dynamic setting defined in continuous time. A numerical simulation shows that a bilateral coalition is the unique self-enforcing IEA independently of the gains coming from cooperation and the kind of strategies played by the agents (open-loop or feedback strategies). We have also studied the effects of a minimum participation clause finding that for this case a self-enforcing IEA just consists of the number of countries established in the clause.JEL Classification: C73, D62, Q28 Corresponding author : Santiago J. RubioThis paper is based on chapter four of Begoña Casinos Ph. Dissertation. Financial support from the Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, the Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología under grant BEC2000-1432 and Fundación BBVAis gratefully acknowledged. We also appreciate the helpful comments of three anonymous referees, whose suggestions improved the paper. Regarding any remaining inadequacies, the usual caveat applies.     

Union games: technological unemployment

Summary. Given a production economy, we define union games by considering strategic behavior of the suppliers of factors. We refer to the Nash equilibria of this game as union equilibria. We analyze situations where the unemployment of factors is supported as a union equilibrium. The degree of unemployment depends on technological conditions. This allows us to model a source of unemployment which differs from the usual sources provided in the literature. We state a limit result that demonstrates that, as the market power of unions decreases, the corresponding sequence of union equilibria converges to the Walrasian equilibrium, that is, to full employment of factors. We also provide some examples that illustrate the main results.Received: 21 October 2004, Revised: 14 December 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D51, C72. Correspondence to: Emma Moreno-GarcíaE. Moreno acknowledges financial support from the Research Grant BEC2000-1388-C04-01 (Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología and FEDER). G. Fernández de Córdoba and E. Moreno acknowledge financial support from the Research Grant SA091/02 from Junta de Castilla y León. We are indebted to C. Alós-Ferrer, C. Pita, D. Anisi, J. A. Ortega, F. Jimeno, J. P. Torres-Martínez, M. Steinert and C. Hervés for helpful comments and insights. We are particularly grateful to T. Kehoe and an anonymous referee for suggestions that improved this paper.     

Optimal investment and production decisions and the value of the firm

We explore the effects of uncertainty on a firm that can respond by modifying its investment or production schedule (or both simultaneously) to variations in output price. Investment may increase capacity and/or reduce costs. We consider a firm with finite resources.Our model uses option theory instead of the more traditional net present value framework. One of the early papers using this approach is Brennan and Schwartz (1985) in which an investment project to extract a finite natural resource is valued. In that paper, the value of the firm is a function of two state variables, the finite resource to be extracted (output to be produced in the future) and the commodity spot price. In order to maximize firm value, the manager can respond by modifying one control variable, the production level. In our model we handle instead three state variables (spot price, resources, accumulated investment) and two control variables (production rate and investment rate), and solve numerically.We obtain both the value and the optimal policy of a firm that has investment projects that increase capacity and/or reduce costs and illustrate optimal policies as resources and available investments decrease over the life of the firm. Firms may start by only investing, then invest and produce, to end only producing.We thank Scott Wo, the referee and the editor for their comments and suggestions. Cortázar and Lowener acknowledge the financial support from FONDECYT and FONDER.     

Kriging methodology for regional economic analysis: Estimating the housing price in Albacete

Because of the socioeconomic importance of the housing subsector in the local, regional, and national economy and its implications for housing policy, this paper attempts to analyze the spatial behavior of the free housing price in the city of Albacete. To achieve this aim, the authors have used the models and estimators imported from geology called kriging. To do this, it is necessary to know the spatial dependence structure of the process, which is shown in the variogram.     

Latin America after the global crisis: the role of export-led and tradable-led growth regimes

Is the ongoing economic slowdown in industrialized countries likely to impact Latin American growth negatively in the medium- to long-run? This paper considers various transmission channels that work through trade in goods and services, and finds econometric evidence suggesting that shrinking global imbalances may create problems for Latin America. Specifically, using panel data analysis, we find that the trade balance as a proportion of GDP is positively associated with Latin American economic growth over the period 1953–2009. We then develop a simple dynamic model to help explain our main finding through investment and saving behaviour.     

Structuring of temporary multi‐organizations: Contingency theory in the building sector

The appropriate management of construction projects presupposes a clear comprehension of the structure of the temporary multi‐organization (TMO); however, most of the work on the structuring of TMOs has concentrated either on procurement strategies or the structure of individual organizations. Current approaches, therefore, do not fully consider the roles of all project stakeholders, the informal communications, and the complexity of the client organization. Instead, we argue that the contingency theory contributes to the understanding of the structuring of TMOs. The analysis of 27 recent construction projects allows us to identify two contingency factors and patterns of configuration of the TMO.     

A legal and economic study of the new Consolidated Text of the Land Use Act of 2008 in Spain

The study conducts a legal and economic analysis comparing the new Consolidated Text of the Land Use Act of 2008 (Texto Refundido de la Ley de Suelo) and the Land Law 6/1998, April 13 now repealed. The study examines various articles contained in the new law and the old law. Although the study analyzes every title in both laws, it focuses on Title III regarding valuations for the expropriation of property owners.     

An N‐factor Gaussian model of oil futures prices

This article studies the ability of an N‐factor Gaussian model to explain the stochastic behavior of oil futures prices when estimated with the use of all available price information, as opposed to traditional approaches of aggregating data for a set of maturities. A Kalman filter estimation procedure that allows for a time‐dependent number of daily observations is used to calibrate the model. When applied to all daily oil futures price transactions from 1992 to 2001, the model performs very well, requiring at least three factors to explain the term structure of futures prices, but four factors to fit the volatility term structure. The model also performs very well for daily copper futures transactions from 1992 to 2001 and for out‐of‐sample daily oil futures transactions from 2002 to 2004. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 26:243–268, 2006