The Court's Power of Discretionary Relief in Actions Against Auditors

Since 1929, successive Companies Acts have empowered the courts to relieve a company auditor, wholly or partly, from liability for negligence having regard to all the circumstances of the case and if the auditor has acted ‘honestly and reasonably’. This power is now contained within section 727 of the Companies Act 1985. By reference to decided cases in the UK and in those Commonwealth countries where similar legislation exists this article reviews the manner in which the courts have interpreted this section and explores the reasons why they have rarely, if ever, chosen to use their powers under this section in favour of auditors.     

The costs and benefits of increased accounting regulation: a case study of Lloyd's of London

While a valuable literature exists on theoretical considerations in cost-benefit analysis (cba) of accounting regulation, and although the regulators themselves acknowledge the need for cost-benefit appraisal of their work, empirical analysis of the costs and benefits of changes in accounting regulation is almost non-existent. This paper attempts such an analysis for a step change in accounting and audit regulation—at Lloyd's between 1982 and 1985. It aims both to advance the cba methodology, and to inform debate about the evolution of the Lloyd's market. While the estimates do not show whether the changes produced an optimal level or form of Lloyd's regulation, they do suggest that, comparing changes, the extra benefits exceeded the extra costs—whether the chosen accounting unit is a private one—Lloyd's Names—or a social one.     

DETERMINANTS OF AUDIT FEES FOR QUOTED UK COMPANIES

This study reports further evidence as to the determinants of the audit fees paid by quoted companies in the UK. It outlines a framework based on the findings from semi-structured interviews with partners in four large audit firms and the results of previous research, and tests this framework by means of multivariate analysis using 1987 data for a large sample of quoted UK companies. A model explaining 87 per cent of the variation in audit fees is constructed. The principal explanatory variables are found to be auditee size, return on shareholders equity, the number of subsidiaries, the lag between the year end and the date of the audit report, the size of the auditor, a measure of auditee diversification, the ownership structure of the auditee, and whether the auditor was based in London, with the last three being new variables introduced in this study.     

How Effective Are Second-Generation Road Funds? A Preliminary Appraisal

Underfunded, inefficient road maintenance is a perennial problemin many developing economies. To address it, some countrieshave created "second-generation" road funds that are financedby fuel levies and managed by boards representing the interestsof road users. Macroeconomists often oppose such funds, arguingthat this earmarking of revenue reduces fiscal flexibility.Some argue that such road funds should be seen as an interimstep toward fully commercialized road maintenance or good publicsector governance—and hence subject to sunset provisions.Decisions on whether to retain (or create) such funds shouldthen be based on their effects on resource allocation, operationalefficiency, and rent seeking. Using evidence on new road fundsin Africa, this article finds that they have not underminedfiscal flexibility. Moreover, they have improved the administrationof road funding (in terms of execution capability) and its outputs(in terms of road conditions). So, although criteria for assessingroad funds remain relevant, the funds should not automaticallybe considered temporary mechanisms. But when establishing newfunds, government's continued role in approving spending onroad maintenance should be explicitly recognized.      

Road Funds, User Charges, and Taxes

Insufficient or uncertain budgetary allocations to road maintenancehave resulted in road deterioration that has significantly increasedproduction and transport costs in many countries. To avoid thisproblem, highway proferssionals advocate the establishment ofdedicated road funds, managed by independent road boards madeup of user representatives. The road boards would have the powerto determine both the level of charges for road use and thelevel of expenditure on road maintenance. By contrast, macroeconomistsand public finance specialists have tended to resist the establishmentof dedicated road funds. They argue that road funds reduce fiscalflexibility, do not adequatedly address problems associatedwith the provision of public goods or the internalization ofexternalities, and often are not well managed. In general, there are two long-term institutional options forreconciling fiscal prudence with asset maintenance; a road agencythat is operated commercially (subject to the normal oversightof behavior accorded to privatized monopolies), or a reformedand well-functioning budget process. This article argues thatroad funds must be viewed as a provisional, case-specific intermediatestep in the direction of one of the long-term solutions. Therole and nature of road funds should be assessed not on generalprinciples but on a case-by-case basis through the analysisof likely micro-and macroeconomic effects. The article recommendsindicatiors for use in specific cases to determine whether aroad fund should be introduced, continued, or abolished.