Accounting for Option–based Compensation: The Economic Cost Approach

The intrinsic value approach amortizes over the life of the option, the difference between the stock price on the date of the grant and the exercise price of the option. The fair market value approach amortizes over the life of the option, the market value of stock options on the date of the grant. These approaches do not reflect the changes in the option–based compensation cost after the grant date. This paper proposes an economic cost approach that not only adjusts for the changes in the value of the options during its life but also records the issuance of the stock at fair market value on the exercise date.     

LEVERAGE,RISK-SHIFTING INCENTIVE,AND STOCK-BASED COMPENSATION

Outstanding risky debt provides risk-shifting incentives for managers fully aligned with stockholders. Earlier research shows that the risk-shifting incentive can be eliminated by using a stock-based compensation design to align managers' and stockholders' interests. I show that stock options as well as compensation designs that align managers' and bondholders' interests eliminate the risk-shifting incentive. Although a stock-based compensation design is not a unique mechanism to eliminate the pure risk-shifting incentive, it is essential where managers of levered firms are known to consume a portion of the investment outlay as perquisites.     

Evaluation of Black-Scholes and GARCH Models Using Currency Call Options Data

This paper empirically examines the performance of Black-Scholes and Garch-M call option pricing models using call options data for British Pounds, Swiss Francs and Japanese Yen. The daily exchange rates exhibit an overwhelming presence of volatility clustering, suggesting that a richer model with ARCH/GARCH effects might have a better fit with actual prices. We perform dominant tests and calculate average percent mean squared errors of model prices. Our findings indicate that the Black-Scholes model outperforms the GARCH models. An implication of this result is that participants in the currency call options market do not seem to price volatility clusters in the underlying process.     

CONVERTIBLE DEBT AND INVESTMENT INCENTIVES

In this paper we examine the effect of convertible debt on the investment incentives facing stockholders. The effect depends critically on the value of existing assets relative to the firm's investment requirements. With a restrictive dividend covenant, convertible debt mitigates the overinvestment incentive associated with risky debt but exacerbates the underinvestment incentive at higher values of existing assets. A less-restrictive dividend covenant exacerbates overinvestment under straight debt financing but reduces the underinvestment incentive induced by the conversion feature. In this context, a convertible debt contract with a less-restrictive dividend covenant maximizes firm value.     

Investment decisions and managerial compensation design in the presence of product market rivalry

We consider an economy where firms operate in an imperfectly competitive industry and mutually affect each others’ investment opportunities. Each firm is assumed to face a mutually exclusive choice of investing in either a short‐ or a long‐term project. For example, firm i's commitment to a short‐term project cuts into firm j's market in the short‐term but frees‐up firm j's long‐term market, and vice versa. Our results show that, even in the absence of an owner–manager conflict, the owner anticipates the product market rivalry and optimally compensates their managers with short‐ as well as long‐term compensation. Although the optimal compensation design induces myopic investment decisions, it is shown to be in the owners’ best interest. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

DO WELL-CONNECTED BOARDS INVEST OPTIMALLY IN R&D ACTIVITIES?

Researchers have argued that the uncertainty surrounding innovative activities causes firms to either underinvest or overinvest in research and development (R&D). We examine whether the information gained by boards through directors’ connections helps mitigate such distortions. We find that an increase in directors’ connections has an asymmetric impact on under- and overinvesting firms. R&D expenditures are shown to increase with board connections. Such increases in R&D intensity exacerbate the extent of overinvestment, resulting in a loss in future market-to-book value. The increase in R&D intensity, however, reduces underinvestment only among firms with higher than average R&D productivity. We find that increased director busyness is one cause of overinvestment.     

RISK-TAKING INCENTIVES OF BANKS AND RISK-ADJUSTED DEPOSIT INSURANCE

The manager of a depository institution is shown to exhibit risk-taking behavior under the current insurance arrangement. Perfect monitoring or risk-based deposit insurance would eliminate this incentive if information were symmetric between bank managers and the insuring agency. Absent symmetric information, it is shown that a recently suggested scheme, where insurers collect insurance premiums based on projected and actual risk levels, does not control the risk-taking incentive. The only way to control this incentive through insurance rates is to levy a relatively high premium, which is not actuarially fair.     

WINNERS AND LOSERS ON NYSE: A RE-EXAMINATION USING DAILY CLOSING BID-ASK SPREADS

We study a sample of NYSE stocks that experienced a large one-day price change during 1992 and were reported as daily largest percentage gainers and largest percentage losers in the Wall Street Journal. The sample indicates significant reversals during the immediate post-announcement period. We test for market efficiency by using bid-ask spreads obtained from the transactions data for the days immediately after the announcement. The overall results indicate that the returns during the reversal period are less than the average bid-ask spread during the same time. We also find that major losers, firms with ?20 percent to ?50 percent event-date abnormal returns, experience price reversals generating returns that are significantly greater than the average bid-ask spread during that period. We interpret this result as consistent with the overreaction hypothesis. A test of a trading rule to exploit this overreaction is not profitable, providing support for weak-form market efficiency.