On the DuPont analysis in the health care industry

Prior research documents that the DuPont components of return on net operating assets (profit margin and asset turnover) represent an incremental source of information about the operating characteristics of a firm and are useful tools for market participants (Soliman, 2008). We find that the informativeness of DuPont components about future profitability is reduced in the healthcare setting, relative to an all-industry sample. Moreover, to the extent that DuPont components are useful for market participants, we show that profit margin is more persistent than asset turnover for US for-profit health care providers, which contradicts the results documented in prior literature that considered all industries. We argue that the special features of the health care industry (i.e. heavy regulation, unique operational characteristics) affect the information content of accounting signals obtained based on financial statements.     

Waiving Technical Default: The Role of Agency Costs and Bank Regulations

Abstract:  This paper examines whether the characteristics of banks and borrowers are associated with banks' decisions to waive violations of debt covenants. The findings suggest that banks possess sufficient private information about firms, and they use this information in their waiver decisions. Banks' decisions to waive violations vary with the borrowers' agency costs, debt features, the banks' characteristics and regulatory circumstances, and the bank-firm business relationship. There is no evidence that syndicated loans, bank structure, and adverse economic conditions are significant determinants of the waiver decision. Research findings offer valuable insight into the theoretical and practical implications of debt covenants and agency costs.     

Impact of proximity to debt covenant violation on earnings management

We examine the impact of differential incentives arising from proximity to debt covenant violation on earnings management. We reason that firms with loans close to violation or in technical default of their debt covenants have a stronger incentive to engage in earnings management than firms that are far from violating their debt covenants. We find results consistent with this expectation. Firms close to violation or in technical default of their debt covenants engage in higher levels of accounting earnings management, real earnings management, and total earnings management than far-from-violation firms. In additional analysis, we find that firms with a stronger incentive to avoid covenant violation switched from using more accounting earnings management before the Sarbanes–Oxley Act to using more real earnings management and more total earnings management afterwards. We also document that the earnings management implications of debt covenant violation are observed primarily for firms with poor credit ratings and for firms that do not meet analyst forecasts.     

Culture's consequences in controlling agency costs: Egyptian evidence

This study examines the business environment of Egypt, a nation at the beginning of its transition to a market economy, to determine whether national culture is associated with the use of accounting-based debt covenants in debt agreements. As a country's economy develops, agency problems occur. One method of reducing agency costs is the use of accounting-based debt covenants. While there has been extensive research on agency theory, most of this research has focused on developed nations. We examine three periods of Egyptian economic development using 140 Egyptian debt agreements. The use of accounting-based debt covenants increased significantly during each successive period of development. Proxies for each of (Hofstede, G. (1980). Culture's consequences—International differences in work-related values. Beverly Hills, London: Sage Publications) cultural dimensions are significantly different between the three periods, suggesting that national culture changes with economic development. Three of the four cultural dimensions are significant when regressed on the number of accounting-based debt covenants in debt agreements. This indicates that as a country develops, national culture is associated with the control and understanding of the business process.     

An Exploration of Ethical Decision-making Processes in the United States and Egypt

In this comparative survey of 191 Egyptian and 92 U.S. executives, we explore the relationship between national culture and ethical decision-making within the context of business. Using Reidenbach and Robin’s (1988) multi-criteria ethics instrument, we examine how differences on two of Hofstede’s national culture dimensions, individualism/collectivism, and power distance, are related to the manner in which business practitioners make ethical decisions. Egypt and the U.S. provide an interesting comparison because of the extreme differences in their economies and related business development. Our results indicate that respondents from the U.S, individualistic and low in power distance, were likely to view the decision making outcome in ethics scenarios as more unethical than the more collectivistic and high power distance Egyptians, when applying ethical criteria based on justice, utilitarianism, relativism, and (contrary to our predictions) egoism. However, we also found that both Egyptians and Americans rely on justice, utilitarianism, and relativism in predicting their intentions to behave ethically, and that Americans substitute egoism for justice, when the behavioral intentions of peers are examined.