Equilibrium price formation in markets with differentially informed agents

We consider a pure exchange economy with a finite set of types of agents which have incomplete and asymmetric information on the states of nature. Our aim was to describe the equilibrium price formation and analyze how the lack of information may affect the allocation of resources. To do so, we adapt to an asymmetric information scenario a variant of the Shapley–Shubik game introduced by Dubey and Geanakoplos (J Math Econ 39:391–400, 2003 ).     

A simple random assignment problem with a unique solution

Summary. All agents have the same ordinal ranking over all objects, receiving no object (opting out) may be preferable to some objects, agents differ on which objects are worse than opting out, and the latter information is private. The Probabilistic Serial assignment, improves upon (in the Pareto sense) the Random Priority assignment, that randomly orders the agents and offers them successively the most valuable remaining object. We characterize Probabilistic Serial by efficiency in an ordinal sense, and envy-freeness. We characterize it also by ordinal efficiency, strategyproofness and equal treatment of equals. Received: October 5, 1999; revised version: December 20, 2000     

Prudent expectations equilibrium in economies with uncertain delivery

In an economy with private information, we introduce the notion of objects of choice as lists of bundles out of which the market selects one for delivery. This leads to an extension of the model of Arrow–Debreu that is used to study trade ex ante with private state verification. Under the assumption that agents are prudent, equilibrium is characterized by the fact that agents consume bundles with the same utility in states that they do not distinguish. This is a weaker condition than the restriction of equal consumption imposed by Radner (Econometrica 36(1), 31–58, 1968), therefore, some no trade situations are avoided and the efficiency of trade increases.     

Aggregation of Directional Distance Functions and Industrial Efficiency

Three main objectives are pursued in this paper. First, we intend to analyze the aggregation problem of directional distance functions from a constructive viewpoint. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions concerning the structural properties of the production technology and of the nature of groups of firms. Indeed, exact additive aggregation holds for a linear technology and for a direction solely defined in the output space. Second, since these conditions are somewhat restrictive, we are interested in providing a measure for the aggregation bias through the relationship between industrial and structural technical efficiency. Finally, we show that this aggregation bias is a lower bound for industrial allocative efficiency.     

Three decades of productivity change in French beef production: a Färe‐Primont index decomposition

The Färe‐Primont index is used to evaluate total factor productivity (TFP) change and its components for a sample of French suckler cow farms in grassland areas in 1985–2014. The results reveal an increase in TFP of 6.6 per cent over the whole observation period, with technological progress being the major source of productivity growth. Meanwhile, efficiency decreased. Farms experienced great technological progress from 1991 to 2000. From a methodological point of view, the comparison with results obtained with Malmquist indexes shows similar trends but different magnitudes, with the Malmquist index overestimating the TFP and technological changes compared to the Färe‐Primont index. In addition, the use of a sequential approach that restricts technological change to being positive or null allows for the precise calculation of technology changes, disregarding the effects of external conditions that are captured in efficiency changes. Finally, the estimation of full dimensional efficient facets (FDEFs) that guarantees the positivity of all shadow prices used to assess the mix efficiency component of TFP change is promising.     

Long-range forecasting within organisations

The article describes a method for testing and developing personal and organisational strategies. It suggests the establishment of a group which includes the organisation's partners and competitors (the author outlines why and how objections to the latter should be overcome) and which would progress through initial “unrealistic” games to more realistic scenarios. When combined with role playing, some “uncomfortable” scenarios can lead to members leaving the group and, where they pinpoint weaknesses, can either strengthen the organisation or hasten its decline. By including the organisations' decision makers, the exercise can lead to a rehearsal of the future.     

Production in incomplete markets: Expectations matter for political stability

In the present paper we study voting-based corporate control in a general equilibrium model with incomplete financial markets. Since voting takes place in a multi-dimensional setting, super-majority rules are needed to ensure existence of equilibrium. In a linear–quadratic setup we show that the endogenization of voting weights (given by portfolio holdings) can give rise to – through self-fulfilling expectations – dramatical political instability, i.e. Condorcet cycles of length two even for very high majority rules.     

Healthcare burden and reimbursement of hospitalization during chemotherapy for adults with Ph-negative relapsed or refractory B-cell precursor acute lymphoblastic leukemia in France: a retrospective chart review

Objective: Philadelphia chromosome negative [Ph(?)] relapsed or refractory (R/R) B-precursor acute lymphoblastic leukemia (ALL) is an extremely rare condition requiring intensive treatment. This retrospective chart review aimed to quantify hospitalizations and reimbursement in this patient population in France.

Methods: Patients aged ≥18 years and with at least one hospitalization for Ph(?) R/R B-precursor ALL were included in the study. They were relapsed with first remission lasting <12 months, relapsed after first salvage therapy, relapsed any time after hematopoietic stem cell transplant (HSCT), or were refractory to initial or salvage therapy. Data were collected from the index date (first diagnosis of R/R ALL) until death or loss to follow-up. The chemotherapy period was defined as the first chemotherapy date after the index date to the earliest of death, loss to follow-up, last chemotherapy dose plus 30 days, or initiation of HSCT. The primary outcome was the percentage of time hospitalized during the chemotherapy period.

Results: Thirty-three patients were included, with a mean age of 49 years. The mean proportion of time spent in the hospital during the chemotherapy period was 46% (95% CI =34–57%). Patients had a mean of 2.2 (SD =1.5) inpatient hospitalizations and the mean length of stay per hospitalization was 16.8 (SD =14.8) days. During the chemotherapy period, the mean amount reimbursed per hospitalization was €31 067 (SD = €4850) and the total hospitalization reimbursement per patient was €68 344. From the index date to death, excluding HSCT, the total reimbursement per patient was €108 873.

Limitations: The sample size was small, although this was expected given the rarity of the patient population.

Conclusions: Adults with Ph(?) R/R B-precursor ALL had repeated and prolonged hospitalizations during salvage chemotherapy. Approximately half the follow-up period was spent in the hospital, and this time was associated with high economic burden in France.