Introduction: Quality of Life Indicators

Economic growth has increased the potential for a materially more fulfilling life. But economic growth has a price: it undermines the contributions of households, communities, and nature, on which all economic activity depends. How can we make visible, in economic terms, the qualities that are lost as a consequence of excessive economic activity? In the spirit of these critical discussions, Feminist Economics has initiated this issue's exploration of quality of life: Which aspects of life do economists regard as essential to the concept? What can we learn from disciplines whose traditions of quality of life research are older than ours? The ten articles that follow suggest, in the brief form allowed by the format, a number of different ways to approach these questions.     

Oil and political survival

Political economy theories on the “natural resource curse” predict that natural resource wealth is a determining factor for the length of time political leaderships remain in office. Whether resource wealth leads to longer or shorter durations in political office depends on the political incentives created by the natural resources, which in turn depend on the types of institutions and natural resource. Exploiting a sample of more than 600 political leadership durations in up to 152 countries, we find that both institutions and resource types matter for the effect that natural resource wealth has on political survival: (i) wealth derived from natural resources affects political survival in intermediate and autocratic, but not in democratic, polities; and (ii) while oil and non-lootable diamonds are associated with positive effects on the duration in political office, minerals are associated with negative duration effects.     

Unpaid household work and the distribution of extended income: The Norwegian experience

Measurement of unpaid household work is important in order to better understand income distribution as well as to give visibility to women's work and achieve more comprehensive estimates of the level of economic activity. This article surveys estimates of unpaid household work in Norway for use in national accounts and analysis of consumption possibilities. The latter are measured by extended income, defined as income after tax plus the value of unpaid household work. We find that extended income appears to be more evenly distributed than money income.     

A Theory of Civil Conflict and Democracy in Rentier States*

The effects of resource rents on the political equilibrium have been studied in two main types of models. The first tradition uses models of conflict, and studies how resource rents affect the intensity and duration of civil conflict. The second tradition uses political economy models, where resource rents affect the political equilibrium due to changes in the costs and benefits of buying votes. Although they provide considerable insight, these traditions have little to say about when democracy emerges, and about when conflict emerges. In this paper, by integrating the earlier model traditions, we suggest the simplest possible framework we can think of to study the choice between conflict and democracy. We show how factors such as resource rents, the extent of electoral competition, and productivity affect economic and political equilibria.     

Constitutions and the resource curse

Utilizing the fact that natural resources are randomly distributed among countries, we investigate how public income shocks have different long run economic effects dependent on constitutional arrangements. We find that (i) the so-called ‘resource curse’ is present in democratic presidential countries—but not in democratic parliamentary countries, (ii) being parliamentary or presidential matters more for the growth effects of natural resources than being democratic or autocratic, and (iii) natural resources are more likely to reduce growth when proportional electoral systems are in place than when the electoral systems are majoritarian. The two first effects appear very robust, the last effect less so.     

Obituary

The environmental risk associated with genetically modified organisms (GMO) implies that new approaches to risk assessment, risk management and risk communication are needed. In this paper we discuss the role of the precautionary principle in policy responses to GMO risk. We first discuss application of the criteria in the European Environment Agency report “Late lessons from early warnings: The precautionary principle 1896–2000” to environmental GMO risk, with focus on crop plants. Moreover, we discuss Bayesian analysis in the context of improving the informational basis for decision‐making under uncertainty. Finally, environmental uncertainties are intertwined with economic uncertainties. Providing incentives for improved risk assessment, risk management and risk communication is crucial for enhancing environmental and social responsibility and thereby facilitate implementation of precautionary approaches. We discuss environmental and social screening of companies as an example of how such incentives can be provided.     

The Effect of Child Care Subsidies: A Critique of the Rosen Model

In an influential article, Sherwin Rosen (1997) argues that Swedish subsidies of child care services lead to a substantial misallocation of resources that slows economic growth. We offer two major reasons why Rosen's approach is flawed. First and foremost, he ignores the positive externalities of increasing the quality of child care, despite their clear relevance to his general equilibrium model. Second, he overlooks distributional impacts, despite evidence that child care subsidies redistribute the costs of children between men and women, rich and poor, young and old. By exploring these and a number of smaller problems with Rosen's model we hope to encourage the development of more systematic efforts to explore the effects of state support for child rearing.