Optimal Dynamic Capital Requirements

We characterize welfare maximizing capital requirement policies in a quantitative macrobanking model with household, firm, and bank defaults calibrated to Euro Area data. We optimize on the level of the capital requirements applied to each loan class and their sensitivity to changes in default risk. We find that getting the level right (so that bank failure risk remains contained) is of foremost importance, while the optimal sensitivity to default risk is positive but typically smaller than under Basel internal ratings based (IRB) formulas. Starting from low levels, savers and borrowers benefit from higher capital requirements. At higher levels, only savers prefer tighter requirements.     

Interest Rates and Credit Risk

This paper explores the effects of shifts in interest rates on corporate leverage and default in the context of a dynamic model in which the link between leverage and default risk comes from the lower incentives of overindebted entrepreneurs to guarantee firm survival. The need to finance new investment pushes firms' leverage ratio above some state‐contingent target toward which firms gradually adjust through earnings retention. The response to interest rate rises and cuts is both asymmetric and heterogeneously distributed across firms. Our results help rationalize some of the evidence regarding the risk‐taking channel of monetary policy.     

Sovereign Credit Risk,Banks' Government Support,and Bank Stock Returns around the World

We explore the joint effect of expected government support to banks and changes in sovereign credit ratings on bank stock returns using data for banks in 37 countries between 1995 and 2011. We find that sovereign credit rating downgrades have a large negative effect on bank stock returns for those banks that are expected to receive stronger support from their governments. This result is stronger for banks in advanced economies where governments are better positioned to provide that support. Our results suggest that stock market investors perceive sovereigns and domestic banks as markedly interconnected, partly through government guarantees.     

The Relation between Price and Performance in the Mutual Fund Industry

Gruber (1996) drew attention to the puzzle that investors buy actively managed equity mutual funds, even though on average such funds underperform index funds. We uncover another puzzling fact about the market for equity mutual funds: Funds with worse before-fee performance charge higher fees. This negative relation between fees and performance is robust and can be explained as the outcome of strategic fee-setting by mutual funds in the presence of investors with different degrees of sensitivity to performance. We also find some evidence that better fund governance may bring fees more in line with performance.     

EXCHANGE RATE-BASED STABILIZATION IN WESTERN EUROPE: GREECE, IRELAND, ITALY, AND PORTUGAL

This paper reviews the experience with exchange rate-based stabilization of four Western European countries–Italy, Ireland, Portugal, and Greece–in 1980–1996 and compares it with the experience of high-inflation developing countries. We find that inflation stabilization was contractionary, in contrast with the expansionary cycle observed in high-inflation countries, although some real exchange rate appreciation took place. Also, frequent adjustments of the exchange rate peg or even its abandonment did not lead to a resumption of inflation, so stabilization programs were successful in all four countries. ( JEL E31, F41)     

Risk Aversion Revisited

In order to supply additional empirical evidence of the effect of wealth on relative risk aversion, this study investigates households' demand for risky assets, using analysis of covariance techniques applied to the asset holdings of Canadian individual households. The extent and pattern of life-cycle effects are also examined. Results generally point to decreasing relative risk aversion when housing is either excluded from the definition of wealth or treated as a riskless asset. The investor's life-cycle plays a prominent role in portfolio selection behavior, with risk aversion increasing uniformly with age. Tax differentials do not seem to be an important element in investment decisions with respect to risk. When the sample and wealth definitions are censored in order to approximate those of previous empirical studies, their findings on relative risk aversion are generally corroborated.     

How Effective Were the Federal Reserve Emergency Liquidity Facilities? Evidence from the Asset‐Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility

The events following Lehman's failure in 2008 and the current turmoil emanating from Europe highlight the structural vulnerabilities of short‐term credit markets and the role of central banks as back‐stop liquidity providers. The Federal Reserve's response to financial disruptions in the United States importantly included the creation of liquidity facilities. Using a differences‐in‐differences approach, we evaluate one of the most unusual of these interventions—the Asset‐Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility. We find that this facility helped stabilize asset outflows from money market funds and reduced asset‐backed commercial paper yields significantly.     

LABOR MARKET EQUILIBRIUM WITH REHIRING

Consistent with the empirical evidence, this article analyzes a labor market in which separations are not permanent and reactivated firms prefer to rehire former employees instead of seek new ones. Workers engage in job search due to the uncertain prospects of rehiring. If firms can commit to wages contingent on rehiring, they backload wages to provide incentives for workers to reduce their unobservable search effort. Under risk aversion and incomplete markets, if productivity at reactivation is sufficiently high, the tension between wage backloading and consumption smoothing leads to excessive search in equilibrium.     

The Evolution of a Financial Crisis: Collapse of the Asset‐Backed Commercial Paper Market

This paper documents “runs” on asset‐backed commercial paper (ABCP) programs in 2007. We find that one‐third of programs experienced a run within weeks of the onset of the ABCP crisis and that runs, as well as yields and maturities for new issues, were related to program‐level and macro‐financial risks. These findings are consistent with the asymmetric information framework used to explain banking panics, have implications for commercial paper investors’ degree of risk intolerance, and inform empirical predictions of recent papers on dynamic coordination failures.