适宜技术、技术选择和发展中国家的经济增长

在本文中，我们认为一个国家最适宜（优）的技术结构内生决定于这个国家的要素禀赋结构。如果一个发展中国家选择与其要素禀赋结构相一致的技术结构，那么这个发展中国家和发达国家之间在全要素生产率以及每个劳动力的人均产出上的差异就会变得最小。进一步地，如果发展中国家选择最适宜的技术，那么由于发展中国家在技术变迁的成本上比发达国家低，因此，发展中国家的经济增长速度可以超过发达国家的经济增长速度，从而，我们可以得出发展中国家可以收敛到发达国家的结论。     

中国的国有企业与金融体制改革

本文在一个统一的理论框架下，对中国国有企业与金融体制的现时状况、改革历程、问题根源与改革方向进行了全面回顾与具体分析。文章指出，国有企业问题的根源在于企业由于承担了政策性负担而丧失了“自生能力”，而金融体系由于承担着为国企服务的任务，所以也变相承担了国企的政策性负担。中国国有企业与金融体制改革要取得成功，就必须先剥离它们的政策性负担，然后再着手解决内部治理机制问题。     

KIDNEY TRANSPLANTS AND THE SHORTAGE OF DONORS: IS A MARKET THE ANSWER?

This article examines the problem of kidney shortages for transplant in the United States. Following a study by Kaserman and Barnett, we reexamine the viability of allowing a market for cadaveric kidneys and estimate the implied equilibrium price based on our survey responses. In sharp contrast to the findings of Kaserman and Barnett, we estimate that a market equilibrium price for cadaveric kidneys may be prohibitively high. Consequently, we support other policy alternatives to increase supply, particularly presumed consent and mandated choice. Our findings also highlight the importance of obtaining data through experiments, rather than a survey, to estimate the impact of financial incentives. ( JEL I18, I12, I00)     

If You Want My Advice: Status Motives and Audit Consultations About Accounting Estimates

Effective consultation is critical for improving the audit of estimates. In an experiment where audit managers acted as consultants to other auditors, we examine conditions in which consultants either recommend estimates that differ substantially from advice‐seekers’ assessments (contrariness) or recommend narrower reasonable ranges of estimates (precision). Psychology theory argues that both of these attributes can improve estimates. We examine whether these attributes depend on consultants' status motives, that is, the desire to gain respect from or power over others. We find that active status motives lead consultants with higher specialized knowledge to provide recommendations that are less contrary, but more precise. However, consultants increase precision by tightening range bounds in a manner that is not counter to management's preference and thus unlikely to prompt the audit team to challenge the estimate. We also find that higher consultant decision authority constrains precision. Our findings suggest limits to consultation's potential effectiveness in improving estimates. For instance, our findings suggest that firms and standard setters direct consultants to focus scrutiny on the range bound that is most likely to constrain management opportunism.     

A Model of Tradeable Capital Tax Permits

Standard models of horizontal capital tax competition predict that, in a Nash equilibrium, states set tax rates inefficiently due to externalities—capital inflow to one state corresponds to capital outflow for another state. Researchers often suggest that the federal government impose Pigouvian taxes to correct for these effects and achieve efficiency. We propose an alternative incentive‐based regulation: tradeable capital tax permits. Under this system, the federal government would require a state to hold a permit if it wanted to reduce its capital income tax rate from some predefined benchmark. These permits would be tradeable across states. We show that, if the federal government sets the correct number of total permits, then social efficiency is achieved. We discuss the advantages of this system relative to the canonical suggestion of Pigouvian taxes.     

后发优势、技术引进和落后国家的经济增长

有别于其他关于技术转移和经济增长的文献，我们提出了一个关于落后国家可以通过发挥后发优势来实现技术追赶的内生增长模型。在我们的模型中，落后国家通过从发达国家引进技术可以获得比发达国家更快的经济增长，并使得落后经济最终收敛到发达经济。     

BIASED REFEREES?: RECONCILING RESULTS WITH THE NBA'S ANALYSIS

In a recent study, we used National Basketball Association (NBA) box‐score data over a 13‐year period including nearly 600,000 foul calls to show that NBA referees call relatively more fouls on players of another race. The NBA commissioned its own study using internal data with information on calls made by individual referees and claimed the results show there is no bias among the referees in the NBA. This paper is an attempt to reconcile these competing claims. (JEL J15, J71)