On the impact of leverage constraints on asset prices and trading volume

Abstract. Researchers have used stylized facts on asset prices and trading volume in stock markets (in particular, the mean reversion of asset returns and the correlations between trading volume, price changes and price levels) to support theories where agents are not rational expected utility maximizers. This paper shows that this empirical evidence is in fact consistent with a standard infinite horizon – perfect information – expected utility economy where some agents face leverage constraints similar to those found in todays financial markets. In addition, and in sharp contrast to the theories above, we explain some qualitative differences that are observed in the price-volume relation on stock and on futures markets. We consider a continuous-time economy where agents maximize the integral of their discounted utility from consumption under both budget and leverage constraints. Building on the work by Vila and Zariphopoulou (1997), we find a closed form solution, up to a negative constant, for the equilibrium prices and demands in the region of the state space where the constraint is non-binding. We show that, at the equilibrium, stock holdings volatility as well as its ratio to stock price volatility are increasing functions of the stock price and interpret this finding in terms of the price-volume relation. We would like to thank the editor and two anonimous referees for valuable substantive comments. Our gratitude also to Franklin Allen, Kerry Back, Domenico Cuoco, Xavier Freixas, Sanford Grossman, Michel Habib, Lutz Hendricks, Richard Kihlstrom, Fernando Restoy, Mary Thomson, Jean-Luc Vila, participants to seminars at Birkbeck College, Carnegie-Mellon, Columbia, ESSEC, HEC, IAE, INSEAD, London Business School, London School of Economics, McGill, Michigan, National University of Singapore, Pompeu Fabra, North Carolina, Washington-St-Louis, Wharton, the Jornadas de Economía Financiera BBV, and the Meetings of the Society for Economic Dynamics and Control and the American Finance Association. Special thanks are due to Süleyman Basak for his enthusiastic support and many helpful suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies. We gratefully acknowledge the support of the BBV and Caja de Madrid Foundations and CREF (both authors) and of the Spanish Ministry of Education under DGICYT grant no. PB93-0388 (first author).     

Finding a Nash equilibrium in spatial games is an NP-complete problem

Summary. We consider the class of (finite) spatial games. We show that the problem of determining whether there exists a Nash equilibrium in which each player has a payoff of at least k is NP-complete as a function of the number of players.Received: 15 September 2002, Revised: 9 March 2003, JEL Classification Numbers: C72.Correspondence to: H. HallerWe thank a referee for helpful comments. The hospitality of the Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen, and the Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna, is gratefully acknowledged by the third author.     

Rawlsian pricing of access to public facilities: A unidimensional illustration

We consider a setting where citizens using a public facility face an idiosyncratic private access cost and must also contribute to the costs of facility. We show that if the population is uniformly spread over the real line, the cost of a facility is independent of location and access costs are linear in distance, the Rawlsian access pricing is the unique cost sharing solution that satisfies the “core property” of secession-proofness. The latter amounts to the voluntary participation principle under which no group of citizens should be charged more than the cost incurred if it had acted on its own.     

Abstracts

Quality & Quantity -     

Incumbency advantage and its value

Markets with network effects are typically concentrated. The aim of this paper is to discuss some recent work on “incumbency advantage.” That is, the fact that firms already installed generate higher profits than entrants even if the latter offer identical or even better terms (in terms of price and quality) to consumers. In particular, we review recently known sources of the advantage and potential mitigating factors and point to a number of open issues.     

Female participation in African labor markets: The role of information and communication technologies

This article investigates the effects of information and communication technologies (ICT) on female labor force participation in a sample of 48 African countries. We specify and estimate linear regression and dynamic panel data models with fixed effects (FE) and system-generalized method of moments (SYS-GMM) estimation over the period 2001–2017. The three main results are that ICT use (mobile phone and internet) significantly stimulates female labor force participation in Africa; this effect is enhanced by financial development and female education; the effect of ICT on female employment in Africa is strongest in the industrial sector. These results remain robust to the provision of social, cultural, and institutional variables.     

Can Federal Grants Mitigate Social Competition?

The European economic integration leads to increasing mobilityof factors, thereby threatening the stability of social transferprograms. This article investigates the possibility to achieveby means of voluntary matching grants both the optimal allocationof factors and the optimal level of redistribution in the presenceof factor mobility. We use a fiscal competition model a la Wildasin(1991) in which states differ in their technologies and preferencesfor redistribution. We first investigate a simple process inwhich the federal authority progressively raises the matchinggrants to the district choosing the lowest transfer and alldistricts respond optimally to the resulting change in transfersall around. This process is shown to increase efficiency ofboth production and redistribution. However, it does not guaranteethat all districts gain, nor that an efficient level of redistributionis attained. Assuming complete information among districts,we derive the willingness of each district to match the contributionof other districts and we show that the aggregate willingnessto pay for matching rates converges to zero when both the efficientlevel of redistribution and the efficient allocation of factorsare achieved. We then describe an adjustment process for thematching rates that will lead districts to the efficient outcomeand guarantee that everyone will gain. (JEL Classification:H23, H70)     

LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY COMPARISON BETWEEN CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND FRANCE

This paper reports on the results of the bilateral study of the comparison of levels of labor productivity in industry between Czechoslovakia and France in 28 branches of industry. Because of the importance of common studies of the questions of productivity of labor and its international comparison, the Economic Commission for Europe of the U.N. decided several years ago to introduce a concrete programme of work in this sphere. This study was made jointly by Czechoslovakia and France. The present paper reports on the first stage of the study, giving results based on physical unit methods. The second stage of the work includes comparisons for branches of industry not covered in this paper, on the basis of value indicator methods; detailed results will be published in respective U.N. series to the end of 1969 (Series Conf. Eur. Stats.).     

DEA APPLIED TO A GAUTENG SAMPLE OF PUBLIC HOSPITALS1

The research presented in this paper provides an analysis of the delivery of a few health care services by the public sector in Gauteng, South Africa. The data for the study was especially difficult to collect, suggesting the need for hospital level data information systems, as well as staff who are trained to analyze the information collected. The empirical results from the analysis suggest that services provided by small‐scale medical facilities waste fewer resources, while medical centres offering more technical services, such as surgeries, also appear to deliver medical services more efficiently.