Investors' carbon risk exposure and their potential for shareholder engagement

This article examines the exposure to and management of carbon risks of different investor types. Considering the dual role as portfolio manager and partial owner, we analyze carbon risk for investors both in terms of exposure to portfolio values and in terms of responsibility as shareholder of carbon-intensive firms. We show that among various investor types, the preference for holding carbon-intensive stocks differs substantially, even when considering traditional investment decision parameters. In particular, it is governments whose portfolio values are most threatened by a carbon risk exposure of 49%, but at the same time, they prefer larger ownership shares in polluting firms. In contrast, individual investors, investment advisors, and mutual funds avoid holding stakes in these firms, while revealing only a moderate exposure of their assets to carbon risk. In view of the Paris Agreement, which includes the consistent steering of financial flows towards a low carbon transformation of the economy, our study provides policymakers with important implications regarding the coverage and effects of respective regulations. By identifying the ownership structures of carbon-intensive firms and respective owners' portfolio compositions, we also offer implications for further research on portfolio decarbonization and shareholders' influence of corporate carbon management.     

Mutual Fund Stock‐Picking Skill: New Evidence from Valuation‐ versus Liquidity‐Motivated Trading

We propose a novel Trade Motivation Matrix that allows differentiating funds’ valuation‐motivated (VM) and liquidity‐motivated (LM) trades on single trade level. It thus enables analyses of stock‐picking skill on three levels: trade, stock, and fund. On trade level, we find significant outperformance of VM buys and significant underperformance of VM sells, indicating manager stock‐picking skills, especially during illiquid market periods. VM trades outperform LM trades, confirming negative performance effects due to flow risk, especially when market liquidity is low. On stock level, collective VM buying explains high future stock returns while collective VM selling is related to future losses, indicating wisdom of the crowd. On fund level, higher trading discretion, measured by a higher degree of VM trading, is observed for smaller, older funds holding higher cash buffers. Finally, higher trading discretion is related to higher future fund alpha, especially during illiquid times.     

Why don’t they answer? Unit non-response in the IAB establishment panel

The paper proposed focuses on the unit-nonresponse in the IAB (Institute for Employment Research) Establishment Panel, a comprehensive data set describing the employer side of the labour market in Germany. Every year since 1993 (1996) the IAB Establishment Panel has surveyed the same establishments from all branches and different size categories in western (eastern) Germany. Although great efforts are taken to convince the owner/manager to take part in the survey there are always firms that do not answer the questionnaire. In this paper the authors try to find out why some establishments are not willing or able to respond to the questionnaire. If the respondent has the authority to provide relevant information, is able to give reliable answers to the questions with a justifiable amount of effort and is interested in the survey in business terms, participation is less frequently refused. The results also confirm the central significance of the interaction between the respondent and the interviewer. If one of the two individuals changes, the probability of further participation falls clearly.