In Search of Theory Development in Grounded Investigations: Doctors' Experiences of Managing as an Example of Fitted and Prospective Theorizing

This article draws on a study of doctors’ experiences of clinical managing to highlight research conventions that limit the development and use of middle range theories in grounded studies. Using sensemaking and the psychological contract as example frameworks, we illustrate how customary deductive evaluations of middle range theories turn grounded researchers away from theory building. As a correction to these conventions, we offer an inductive approach to building existing theory in grounded investigations that does not depend solely on working with frameworks under different empirical conditions. We suggest that forward theorizing is most likely to progress from a synthesis of fitted explanation and prospective thinking that presses at the limits of the data's usefulness. To illustrate this approach, trialled thinking about novel theoretical juxtapositions and alternative sources was used in conjunction with our clinical director data. The value of this approach was supported in two ways. First, a number of fitted and prospective conjectures are offered about how social identity articulates with psychological contracts and sensemaking in role change situations. Second, new light is shed on the process by which particular social conditions differentially modify employees’ social categorizations, and how these inform employee responses to the evolving experience of role change. The article concludes with some tentative proposals for promoting more discussion of theory building in grounded investigations.     

Numerical issues in threshold autoregressive modeling of time series

This paper analyses the contribution of various numerical approaches to making the estimation of threshold autoregressive time series more efficient. It relies on the computational advantages of QR factorizations and proposes Givens transformations to update these factors for sequential LS problems. By showing that the residual sum of squares is a continuous rational function over threshold intervals it develops a new fitting method based on rational interpolation and the standard necessary optimality condition. Taking as benchmark a simple grid search, the paper illustrates via Monte Carlo simulations the efficiency gains of the proposed tools.     

Evidence on the existence of speculative bubbles in farmland prices

We conduct tests for the contribution of speculative bubbles to farmland prices. These tests are carried out under the hypothesis that farmland investors rationally form expectations. The outcome of tests reported here allows us to infer whether farmland prices are determined by market fundamentals-discounted returns from the highest economic land use-or whether rumors about farmland price movements are self-fulfilling. The tests are stationarity and cointegration tests relating farmland prices to rents. The tests are carried out using data from three farm production regions-the Corn Belt, the Northern Plains, and the Lake States. In each region, we find little evidence to reject the hypothesis that market fundamentals determine farmland prices.     

Applying continuous improvement to teaching in another culture

As international business programs proliferate, the mixing of many cultures in the classroom creates new teaching challenges. This paper reports on how an American accounting professor coped with cultural differences at INSEAD in France. Student evaluations for the first course taught at INSEAD revealed a variety of problems that the professor tried to resolve by applying the principles of continuous improvement in the next course he taught. Confronting the students directly with the problem, enlisting their aid in improving the course, and eliciting specific feedback all combined to substantially raise the level of student satisfaction. The principles applied in this intervention are broadly applicable to college professors, not only those working with “international” students.     

Rationing in open economy and dynamic macroeconomics: A survey

Summary A survey of rationing in micro theories of macroeconomics is presented. The survey starts with a closed economy with money and inventories, which consists of a representative household, a firm and government. After a discussion of the notional demands and supplies and the properties of the Walrasian equilibrium, a discussion of the effective demands and supplies leads to an analysis of the four regimes (Keynesian unemployment, classical unemployment, repressed inflation and underconsumption). A fiscal and monetary contraction decreases sales and employment when there is Keynesian unemployment, but is expansionary (neutral) when there is repressed inflation (classical unemployment). The survey continues with an analysis of the effects of rationing in a small open economy. It considers the one-sector model and a model with a traded and a nontraded sector. The latter model is used to discuss the effects of an oil discovery on the Gulf countries and on Latin American countries. The survey ends with a discussion of rationing in dynamic economies, which leads to an analysis of the effects of expectations about future constraints on current regimes and to a discussion of boot-strap equilibria.The author is Director of the Network for Quantitative Economics. This paper is a brief and eclectic survey of rationing models of closed one-period and two-period economies and of small open economies. It contains no significant new material. The author is grateful to Professor Theo van de Klundert for his constructive comments on an earlier version of this survey.     

Are serial Condorcet rules strategy-proof?

Abstract. This paper explores the extent to which majority rule is invulnerable to manipulation by individuals and coalitions, even when majority rule is used to select more than one alternative. The resulting rule may or may not be strategy-proof, depending on the size of the coalitions that can form, and on the nature of the individual preferences over sets of alternatives. No individual can manipulate with respect to a wide family of preferences over sets. The only restriction on the domain of true and revealed individual preferences is that the selection rule is always well defined. Received: 1 November 1999 / Accepted: 7 May 2001 We thank two anonymous referees for suggestions that have significantly improved the paper. We are also grateful to l'Université de Caen for sponsoring a Workshop on Social Choice Theory, where a first draft of this paper was presented in May, 1999, and to the workshop participants for helpful observations. Work on the final version of the paper was done while one of the authors was a guest of the Project on Intergenerational Equity supported by the Ministry of Education, Science, and Technology of Japan. We are grateful to the Ministry and to the project leader, Professor Kotaro Suzumura, for their support.     

Selection dynamics and adaptive behavior without much information

This paper uses the experimental method to investigate behavior in a coordination game when the information available to subjects is limited to their feasible choices and their experienced payoffs. In the experiment subjects converge to an absorbing state at rates that are orders of magnitude faster than reinforcement learning algorithms, but slower than under complete information. This state is very close to a mutual best response outcome. All cohorts converged to the market statistic predicted by the interior equilibrium regardless of the information conditions or the stability conditions. Eric Battalio programmed the graphical user interface. The National Science Foundation and Texas Advanced Research Program provided financial support. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation or the Texas Advanced Research Program.     

‘Double dipping’: the combined effects of social security and civil service pensions on employee retirement

How do macro variables such as aggregate consumption, aggregate money demand, prices, and interest rates vary in response to government attempts to redistribute income across agents through selective tax-transfer policies? This question is investigated for an overlapping generations model consisting of heterogeneously endowed three-period lived agents. In the presumably most favorable case for invariance (identical log-linear utility functions), it is shown that positive interest rate macro equilibria are invariant with respect to redistributions in social security benefits if and only if all agents initially exhibit qualitatively identical liquidity preference behavior, i.e. positive money holding only in youth, only in middle-age, or never.