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This article investigates the role of taxation when public goods are privately provided. Externalities between consumers via the public good are shown to cause kinks in social indifference curves. As a result, a government restricted to income taxation should engineer enough inequality to ensure there are some non-contributors to the public good. Whether commodity taxation changes this conclusion depends on the extent to which consumers "see through" the government budget constraint. If they can, inequality should still be sought. When they cannot, in contrast to the case of an economy with only private goods, commodity taxation can be used in conjunction with income transfers to achieve the first-best. 相似文献
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Conjectural Variations and Voluntary Public Good Provision in a Repeated Game Setting 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
The purpose of this paper is to show how conjectural variations can be derived as a reduced form in an infinitely repeated game of private provision of public goods. We obtain explicit closed forms of conjectural variations associated with maximal sustainable equilibria in which the sum of the utilities of all of a community's members is maximized for both quadratic and Cobb–Douglas preferences, provided that the resulting sequence of contributions can be sustained as a Nash (or subgame perfect) equilibrium in the underlying repeated game. We also show that positive conjectural variations will emerge as long as people place positive weight on the future, and that those conjectures are positively related to the discount factor. 相似文献
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A dynamic model of fiscal reconstruction 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
This paper investigates dynamic properties of fiscal reconstruction by analyzing the infinite duration differential game among interest groups with a framework of voluntary acceptance of tax burden. By comparing the first-best solution of fiscal reconstruction, the open-loop Nash equilibrium path, and the feedback Nash equilibrium path, we highlight the free-riding behavior of interest groups in the process of fiscal reconstruction. We derive explicitly the target levels of government debt and primary expenditures, and the adjustment speed of fiscal reconstruction under the respective solutions. We also examine the impacts of consumption taxes on their adjustment speeds as well as long-run outcomes of the respective paths. 相似文献
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The object of this paper is to investigate the long‐run behaviour of rent‐seekers in a situation where they incur negative expected payoffs due to increasing returns to rent‐seeking expenditures. To this end, we embed the one‐shot rent‐seeking game presented by Tullock (1980) in the war‐of‐attrition framework. In this multi‐period setting, each player not only determines his or her rent‐seeking expenditure but also chooses a mixed strategy on whether to stay in or exit from rent‐seeking competition in each period. JEL Classification Numbers: D72, C72, L12 相似文献
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This paper reexamines the main findings of Cardarelli et al. [Cardarelli, R., Taugourdeau, E., Vidal, J.-P., 2002. A repeated interactions model of tax competition, Journal of Public Economic Theory 4, 19-38], and Catenaro and Vidal [Catenaro, M., Vidal, J.-P., 2006. Implicit tax co-ordination under repeated policy interactions, Recherches Economiques de Louvain 72, 1-17], who show that regional asymmetries undermine the implicit collusion of tax coordination in a repeated game model of capital tax competition. In particular, this paper investigates how increased regional differences in per capita capital endowments and/or production technologies affect the willingness of each region to cooperate in achieving tax coordination. It is shown that there may exist cases where as regional asymmetries in net capital exporting positions increase, regions are more likely to cooperate on capital taxes and thereby achieve tax coordination. 相似文献
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Abstract . A pure public good is provided by the government and the voluntary contributions of two types of households. The government finances its contribution by means of income taxation. The latter has distortionary effects. A third type of household never makes contributions. We analyse the effects of changes in the income tax rate on (a) the provision of the public good, (b) the private contributions of the households, and (c) changes in the distribution of income and welfare between contributing and non-contributing households. We derive a simple and testable condition under which the lowering of the income tax entails a Pareto improvement. 相似文献
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This paper examines the long‐run impacts of selective (or sector‐specific) commodity, payroll, and profit taxes in a two‐sector endogenous growth model with sector‐specific production externalities, in which one sector produces consumption goods and the other produces investment goods. The novelty of the model is that it allows not only for endogenous labour supply but also for the intersectoral allocation of resources, which may together lead to indeterminacy. We analytically show that the stability properties of the long‐run equilibrium critically affect the long‐run effects of these selective taxes, which may reverse the standard results of the growth effects of distortionary taxes. 相似文献
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This paper examines the long-run effects of capital income taxes, labor income taxes, and expenditure taxes in an R&D-based
model of endogenous growth with endogenous labor supply. The main contribution of this paper is to investigate how tax effects
on long-run growth are influenced by the emergence of indeterminate equilibria. Indeterminacy in this instance arises due
to nonseparable preferences between consumption and leisure, in conjunction with prior distortionary taxes. In contrast to
conventional wisdom, we show that higher distortionary taxes improve long-run growth, as well as social welfare, when the
steady state is indeterminate. 相似文献