OPTIMAL GROWTH IN A TWO‐SECTOR RSS MODEL WITHOUT DISCOUNTING: A GEOMETRIC INVESTIGATION*

This essay reports results on optimal growth in a two‐sector model with fixed coefficients, irreversible investment and no discounting. Under normalization, the model can be represented by two real numbers, but despite its deceptive simplicity, it admits rich transition dynamics and apparent pathologies that seem to have been missed in earlier work. From a methodological point of view, and in the light of recent work of Nishimura and Yano, this essay can also be seen as a further rehabilitation of geometric methods as an engine of analysis.     

Option Valuation with Systematic Stochastic Volatility

We use an extension of the equilibrium framework of Rubinstein ( 1976 ) and Brennan ( 1979 ) to derive an option valuation formula when the stock return volatility is both stochastic and systematic. Our formula incorporates a stochastic volatility process as well as a stochastic interest rate process in the valuation of options. If the “mean,” volatility, and “covariance” processes for the stock return and the consumption growth are predictable, our option valuation formula can be written in “preference-free” form. Further, many popular option valuation formulae in the literature can be written as special cases of our general formula.     

THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL CREDIT AS AN INSTRUMENT OF TRADE*

This paper is an investigation of the role of international credit as a factor influencing the donor Countries' exports. Based on standard techniques of microeconomic theory, our model examines this relationship under different market structures in the industrialized donor country (North). Under monopoly and perfect competition, the availability of credit increases the North's exports; under oligopoly, within a class of parametric configurations, this relationship is reversed. We also find that, under certain conditions, if a developing country (South) takes recourse to international credit to finance its imports, it would end up worse off, that is the availability of international credit can be welfare-decreasing for the borrowing nation.     

Asymmetric Punishment as an Instrument of Corruption Control

The control of bribery is a policy objective in many developing countries. It has been argued that asymmetric punishments could reduce bribery by incentivizing whistle‐blowing. This paper investigates the role played by asymmetric punishment in a setting where bribe size is determined by Nash bargaining, detection is costly, and detection rates are set endogenously. First, if whistle‐blowing is infeasible, the symmetry properties of punishment are irrelevant to bribery deterrence but not to bribe size. Bribery disappears if expected penalties are sufficiently high; otherwise, bribe sizes rise as expected penalties rise. Second, when the bribe‐giver may whistle‐blow, a switch from symmetric to asymmetric punishment eliminates bribery only if whistle‐blowing is cheap and the stakes are low. When bribery persists, multiple bribe sizes could survive in equilibrium. The paper derives parameter values under which each of these outcomes occurs, and discusses implications for welfare and the design of policy.     

Determinacy, Learnability, and Monetary Policy Inertia

We show how monetary policy inertia can help alleviate problems of indeterminacy and non-existence of stationary equilibrium observed for some commonly studied monetary policy rules. We also find that inertia promotes learnability of equilibrium. The context is a simple, forward-looking model of the macroeconomy widely used in the rapidly expanding literature in this area. We conclude that this might be an important reason why central banks in the industrialized economies display considerable inertia when adjusting monetary policy in response to changing economic conditions.     

Does Ricardian Equivalence Hold When Expectations Are Not Rational?

This paper considers the Ricardian Equivalence proposition when expectations are not rational and are instead formed using adaptive learning rules. We show that Ricardian Equivalence continues to hold provided suitable additional conditions on learning dynamics are satisfied. However, new cases of failure can also emerge under learning. In particular, for Ricardian Equivalence to obtain, agents’ expectations must not depend on government’s financial variables under deficit financing.     

Option Trading,Price Discovery,and Earnings News Dissemination*

Abstract. Option market activity increases by more than 10 percent in the four days before quarterly earnings announcements. We show that the direction of this preannouncement trading foreshadows subsequent earnings news. Specifically, we find option traders initiate a greater proportion of long (short) positions immediately before “good” (“bad”) earnings news. Midquote returns to active-side option trades are positive during nonannouncement periods and are significantly higher immediately prior to earnings announcements. Bid-ask spreads for options widen during the announcement period, but traders do not gravitate toward high delta contracts. Collectively, the evidence shows option traders participate generally in price discovery (the incorporation of private information in price), and more specifically in the dissemination of earnings news.     

Privatization,Underpricing, and Welfare in the Presence of Foreign Competition

We analyze privatization in a differentiated oligopoly setting with a domestic public firm and foreign profit‐maximizing firms. In particular, we examine pricing below marginal cost by the public firm, the optimal degree of privatization, and the relationship between privatization and foreign ownership restrictions. When market structure is exogenous, partial privatization of the public firm improves welfare by reducing public sector losses. Surprisingly, even at the optimal level of privatization, the public firm's price lies strictly below marginal cost, resulting in losses. Our analysis also reveals a potential conflict between privatization and investment liberalization (i.e., relaxing restrictions on foreign ownership) in the short run. With endogenous market structure (i.e., free entry of foreign firms), partial privatization improves welfare through an additional channel: more foreign varieties. Furthermore, at the optimal level of privatization, the public firm's price lies strictly above marginal cost and earns positive profits.     

Jump Diffusion Option Valuation in Discrete Time

We develop a simple, discrete time model to value options when the underlying process follows a jump diffusion process. Multivariate jumps are superimposed on the binomial model of Cox, Ross, and Rubinstein (1979) to obtain a model with a limiting jump diffusion process. This model incorporates the early exercise feature of American options as well as arbitrary jump distributions. It yields an efficient computational procedure that can be implemented in practice. As an application of the model, we illustrate some characteristics of the early exercise boundary of American options with certain types of jump distributions.     

Beyond Basis Basics: Liquidity Demand and Deviations from the Law of One Price

Deviations from the law of one price between futures and spot prices—the futures-cash basis—capture information about liquidity demand for equity market exposure in global markets. We show that the basis comoves with dealer and investor futures positions, is contemporaneously positively correlated with futures and spot market returns, and negatively predicts futures and spot returns. These findings are consistent with the futures-cash basis reflecting liquidity demand that is common to futures and cash equity markets. We find persistent supply-demand imbalances for equity index exposure reflected in the basis, giving rise to an annual premium of 5% to 6%.